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 The prolonged wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken a toll on the United States as a 
whole and the United States military in particular.  The primary aim of this research is to 
determine what impact the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have had on the performance of military 
hospitals over the fiscal years 2001-2006.  Specifically, what direct effect has the war in Iraq and 
Afghanistan had on the productivity and quality of military hospitals, and, do productivity and 
quality trends differ based on hospital characteristics?  Since observations over multiple time 
periods are nested within hospitals, multilevel mixed effects regression and Poisson regression 
models are used to evaluate changes in productivity and quality while accounting for differences 
within hospitals.  Using a contingency theory framework, this study fills the gap in looking at the 
impact of war on permanent military hospitals’ productivity and quality using nationally 
  
developed and implemented quality indicators (Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research 
Inpatient Quality Indicators and Patient Safety Indicators).   
 Structural characteristics of the hospital, teaching status and branch of Armed Service 
influenced productivity and certain quality indicators.  The structural components were not able 
to reliably predict differences in productivity and all quality indicators, but overseas hospitals 
and non-teaching hospitals were most likely to differ from major teaching hospitals.  The wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, denoted by the variables for wounded discharges and deployed staff, were 
only partially related to the productivity of military hospitals.  Only an increase in the percentage 
of wounded discharges was related to productivity of military hospitals, and none were related to 
the quality indicators.  In essence, the war affected the workload and productivity of military 
hospitals, but it did not affect the quality provided in the hospitals, as measured by AHRQ 
inpatient and patient safety quality indicators.  Structural characteristics account for more of the 
variation in quality among military hospitals than the impact of war within the timeframe 
studied.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
 Operation Iraqi Freedom began when President George W. Bush gave the order to invade 
Iraq on March 19, 2003 (White House, 2003).  At the time, over 340,000 United States military 
troops were staged in the Persian Gulf region (Bowman, 2003).  The traditional military 
offensive lasted less than two months.  On May 1, 2003, President Bush declared the end of 
major combat operations in Iraq in front of the now infamous “Mission Accomplished” sign 
(CNN, 2003).  Stability operations that followed the end of combat operations have taken a 
greater toll on the United States military than the initial offensive.  The lack of initial control by 
the United States soon led to a sectarian civil war in Iraq.  After the troop surge in 2007 and 
strengthening of the Iraqi government, Iraq became less volatile.  As violence receded in Iraq, 
the United States military confronted escalating violence in Afghanistan.  By the end of October 
2007, over 1.6 million United States service members had been deployed to the conflicts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan (Tanielian & Jaycox, 2008).  Since the final military troop presence left Iraq on 
December 31, 2011, it is fitting to look back to see how the Iraqi Conflict affected the Military 
Health System in the United States.   
 The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan were the first prolonged combat operations that the 
United States has fought with an all volunteer force, and the operations tempo has been 
unprecedented (Tanielian & Jaycox, 2008).  At the same time, advances in battlefield medical 
care, air evacuation, and equipment such as body armor have increased not only the number of 
wounded patients returning to military hospitals when compared to previous wars, but also the 
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acuity of those wounded patients (Montgomery, Swiecki, & Shriver, 2005; Tanielian & Jaycox, 
2008).  Goldberg (2010) compares the wounded to hostile death ratio of Iraq and Afghanistan 
(9.2 to 1) to Vietnam (6.4 to 1) using Congressional Budget Office data through January 2007. 
 The wounded patients are treated in mobile military hospitals in the theater of operations.  
The military has two types of hospitals:  mobile and permanent.  Mobile military hospitals (such 
as fleet hospitals and combat support hospitals) deploy with combat units to provide medical care 
in the theater of operations.  Permanent military hospitals provide inpatient and outpatient health 
services, including primary and specialty care, to wounded patients evacuated from the theater of 
operations as well as Department of Defense (DOD) beneficiaries.  Beneficiaries include active 
duty uniformed service members, retirees, their respective family members, and surviving 
dependents of deceased service members (TRICARE, 2008-a).  As wounded soldiers return to 
military medical centers and hospitals in the United States for recuperation, these facilities must 
adapt in order to treat both their normal peacetime patients and these high acuity wartime 
patients.  The permanent military hospitals are the subjects of this study.   
Study Purpose 
 The primary aim of this research is to determine what impact the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have had on the productivity and quality of United States military hospitals over the 
fiscal years (FY) 2001-2006.  By doctrine, military hospitals in the continental United States 
provide definitive care for the members of the armed forces who are wounded in action.  Due to 
the medical advances briefly noted above, wounded patients arriving at military medical centers 
require extensive surgery and medical intervention in addition to rehabilitation that was required 
in previous military conflicts.  In addition, rehabilitation of these serious wounds is much more 
extensive than before, leading to the opening of two Centers of Excellence:  National Intrepid 
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Center of Excellence (NICoE) for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury in 2010 and 
Center for the Intrepid (CFI) for amputee care in 2007.   The military hospitals must also contend 
with losing military nurses, physicians, allied health professionals and administrative personnel 
to operational combat units deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.  During times of war and 
contingency operations, military medical personnel assigned to hospitals and clinics are attached 
to operational forces (e.g., combat support hospitals, expeditionary medical facilities, and 
brigade combat teams) as they deploy.  The hospital staff may also succumb to compassion 
fatigue (Stewart, 2009) while treating the wounded soldiers as well as dealing with possible 
traumatic stress from hostile situations from their own deployment (Gibbons, Hickling, & Watts, 
2012). The increase in workload, turnover in staff, stressors related to war, increased training 
requirements and preparations for deployment may negatively influence efficiency in military 
hospitals.  In the meantime, the focus of peacetime medicine has been on increasing cost 
efficiency through increases in productivity and quality.  In light of these dueling objectives, the 
two research questions in the study are: 
 1) Overall, how did productivity and quality change over the years 2001-2006 in military 
hospitals?  Specifically, what direct effect has the war in Iraq and Afghanistan had on the 
productivity and quality of military hospitals? 
 2) Do productivity and quality trends differ over the years 2001-2006 by type of hospital?  
 Military hospitals provide inpatient care as well as outpatient primary and specialty care.  
The factors that affect quality and productivity for the inpatient setting may be different from the 
outpatient setting, especially since quality and productivity measures differ for the two settings.  
For the purposes of this study, only services provided in the inpatient setting are analyzed.  
Quality in the inpatient setting is assessed using inpatient quality indicators. This study uses peer 
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reviewed measures developed by the Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research. The inpatient 
quality indicators (IQIs) and patient safety indicators (PSIs) should reflect quality of inpatient 
hospital care focusing on mortality (IQIs) and potentially avoidable complications (PSIs). 
Data and Analysis 
 This study analyzes military hospitals over a six-year period from FY 2001 to FY 2006.  
The Military Health System (MHS) Data Repository (MDR) is a “data warehouse containing the 
most complete collection of data about healthcare provided to beneficiaries of the MHS” 
(TRICARE Management Activity, 2010, p. 4).  The MDR stores over 10 years of clinical and 
financial data for all military hospitals and clinics and is the primary database for this 
dissertation.  Data from the numerous information systems in the MHS are funneled to the 
centralized MDR enabling corporate decision making at all levels: hospital, region, branch of 
service and MHS. 
 Data are collected in a panel design with quality and productivity measures recorded for 
each hospital every fiscal year over a six year period of time.  The time period FY 2001 to FY 
2006 covers one year before U.S. forces entered Afghanistan to the year prior to the surge in Iraq 
in 2007.  The MHS also underwent a transformation following the Quadrennial Defense Review 
in 2006, which is outlined in the MHS Strategic Plan entitled “A Roadmap for Medical 
Transformation” (Military Health System, 2008).  In order to assess the quality and productivity 
of military hospitals prior to the transformation and change in strategy, data for this study were 
gathered through FY 2006.  The final dataset includes hospital characteristics such as branch of 
service and teaching status as well as number of deployed staff, number of wounded discharges, 
nurse and clinician staffing, contract staffing, case mix index, and productivity and quality 
measures.  Quality measures were calculated with the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
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Quality’s (AHRQ) Quality Indicators Software (AHRQ-b, 2006).  The software uses individual 
discharge information for each hospital extracted from the MDR to formulate applicable patient 
safety indicators (PSI) and inpatient quality indicators (IQI), which became dependent variables 
in the study.  Both IQIs and PSIs reflect the quality of care, focusing on the processes, during the 
hospital stay (Coffey et. al., 2010). 
 Observations over multiple time periods are nested within hospitals.  Therefore, to 
determine change in productivity over the period of the study, a multilevel mixed effects model 
using a random coefficient modeling framework is used.  To determine change in quality over 
time, a multilevel mixed effects model with Poisson regression is used because the quality 
variables are counts of deaths or adverse events.     
Significance of the Study 
 There are few studies of military hospitals during wartime.  Most of the focus of study 
has been on mental health utilization following deployment (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 
2006; Hoge et al., 2004; Erbes, et al., 2007; Thomas et al., 2010; Kok et al., 2012) or descriptive 
studies of types of war injuries and deployed unit experiences (Cancio et al., 2005; Murray, et 
al., 2005; Fox et al., 2005; Zouris, Walker, Dye & Galarneau, 2006).  Studies of quality do not 
directly link to the association between changes in quality to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
With the emphasis on transparency in government run health care, it is important that military 
hospitals utilize the same quality metrics as the rest of the healthcare sector.  This study fills the 
gap in looking at the impact of war on permanent military hospitals’ productivity and quality 
using nationally developed and implemented quality indicators.  Results from this study increase 
the understanding of military hospitals’ response over time as reflected in the changes in 
productivity and quality. 
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Organization of the Dissertation 
 The purpose of this study is to determine what impact the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have had on the productivity and quality of military hospitals.  The introduction outlined the 
rationale for conducting the study.  The literature review in Chapter 2 provides more insight into 
the military health system and the roles of military hospitals, information about the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, and the current state of hospital performance measurement.  Chapter 3 
delineates the theoretical framework based on Contingency Theory and the conceptual model for 
the study.  The data and analytical methods are explained in Chapter 4 with results of the 
analysis contained in Chapter 5.  Chapter 6 provides the discussion of the results with limitations 
and implications.    
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 
 
Military Health System 
 The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) is responsible for all health policies, 
programs, and activities for the DOD.  The mission of the Military Health System (MHS) in 
2006 was “[t]o enhance the Department of Defense and our Nation’s security by providing health 
support for the full range of military operations and sustaining the health of all those entrusted to 
our care” (Military Health System, 2006, p. 3).  As the quote illustrates, the MHS has a two-fold 
mission:  operational support and beneficiary care.  The MHS needs to be prepared to provide 
health care services before, during and after deployments in support of military operations.  In 
addition, the beneficiary mission provides peacetime healthcare services to active duty military, 
their family members, and others entitled to DOD healthcare.  Indeed, the 2006 MHS Strategic 
Plan states that there are two main, but not mutually exclusive, customer groups: 1) commanders 
and service members; and 2) beneficiaries. With the updated MHS Strategic Plan in 2008, “Our 
team provides optimal Health Services in support of our nation’s military mission – anytime, 
anywhere” became the new mission statement for the MHS (Military Health System, 2008, p. 2).  
 The MHS provides health care for 9.7 million DOD beneficiaries with expenditures over 
$52 billion per year (Military Health System, 2012).  The care is provided by a combination of 
direct care (care delivered in health care facilities directly operated by DOD agencies) and 
purchased care (care contracted through civilian health facilities).  TRICARE is the health plan 
that incorporates the two components, direct care and purchased care.  In 2009, 23% of inpatient 
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care and 46% of outpatient care were delivered in military medical facilities.  The rest was 
purchased in the private sector.  $14.6 billion of the FY 2010 Defense Health Program (DHP) 
budget was for private sector care (Hunter, 2010).   
 TRICARE offers three general options for DOD beneficiaries: managed care options 
(TRICARE Prime, TRICARE Prime Remote, TRICARE Prime Overseas, TRICARE Prime 
Remote Overseas, US Family Health Plan), fee for service options (TRICARE Standard, 
TRICARE Standard Overseas, TRICARE Extra) and a Medicare wraparound coverage 
(TRICARE for Life) (TRICARE Management Activity, 2012).  For the managed care options, 
most fall under the umbrella of TRICARE Prime, a health maintenance organization (HMO) 
option where enrollees are assigned primary care providers (PCP) who manage their care.  It is 
the only group of options where beneficiaries must enroll.  Under TRICARE Prime, enrollees 
may choose a military facility PCP or a network PCP (TRICARE Management Activity, 2012).  
For the fee for service options, beneficiaries may see any TRICARE-authorized provider for 
care.  By using preferred network providers, beneficiaries utilize TRICARE Extra which 
provides beneficiaries a 5% discount on coinsurance, usually based on negotiated rates instead of 
the TRICARE maximum allowable charge under TRICARE Standard (TRICARE Management 
Activity, 2011-a).   
 For seniors 65 years old and over, in order to take advantage of TRICARE for Life, they 
must be enrolled in Medicare Parts A and B, and TRICARE becomes a wrap around 
supplemental insurance for Medicare.  Medicare is the primary payer, and TRICARE is the 
secondary payer in most situations in the United States (TRICARE Management Activity, 2012). 
 All active duty personnel are automatically enrolled in TRICARE Prime at the military 
facility closest to the unit to which they are assigned.  Active duty family members and retirees 
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and their family members under 65 years have the choice of the managed care or fee-for-service 
options.  Of the 9.7 million DOD beneficiaries, 5.6 million were enrolled in TRICARE Prime, 
and 2 million were enrolled in TRICARE for Life, the option for beneficiaries 65 years and 
older.  Beneficiaries choosing not to enroll, 2.1 million beneficiaries, default to TRICARE 
Standard (TRICARE Management Activity, 2011-c).  Over 65% of beneficiaries with a choice 
(non-active duty and below 65 years of age) selected enrollment in TRICARE Prime in 2011 
(TRICARE Management Activity, 2011-c).   
 The United States is divided into three TRICARE regions:  North, South, and West.  A 
separate TRICARE contractor for each of the three regions coordinates all purchased care 
unavailable at each military facility due to lack of capacity or lack of service mix.  In addition, 
beneficiaries who elect TRICARE Extra or Standard receive purchased care regardless of what is 
available in military medical facilities.  In the direct care system of the MHS, there are 59 
military hospitals offering inpatient care in 2010 (Hunter, 2010).  Many military hospitals are 
closing or changing to outpatient facilities.  From FY 2001 to FY 2006, the number of military 
organizations operating inpatient facilities decreased from 77 to 67.   The difference from 2006 
to 2010 (67 to 59 inpatient facilities) reflects the additional eight military hospitals that have 
closed or stopped offering inpatient services during that time.  The military health system 
parallels the civilian healthcare trend toward more outpatient care and less inpatient care.   
 In 2006, there were 25 teaching hospitals, which vary greatly in capabilities and size.  In 
order to categorize them more uniformly, teaching hospitals were split into major teaching and 
minor teaching hospitals, a common categorization of teaching status (Landon et al., 2006; 
Vartak, Ward & Vaughn, 2008).  Studies differentiate major vs. minor teaching hospitals by 
whether the hospital is a member of the Council of Teaching Hospitals and Health Systems 
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(COTH), but none of the military hospitals are members of COTH (Association of American 
Medical Colleges, 2005). Since one of the criteria for membership in COTH is participating in at 
least four residency programs (Association of American Medical Colleges, 2011), military 
hospitals having four or more residency programs according to the Accreditation Council for 
Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) were designated as major teaching hospitals for this 
study (ACGME, 2007).  Major teaching hospitals are academic medical centers offering tertiary 
care and generally have more than 150 beds (Army Medicine, 2006).  Non-teaching hospitals are 
community hospitals providing secondary care and usually have fewer than 150 beds.  Minor 
teaching hospitals are generally community hospitals that provide some graduate medical 
education.  Table 1 provides a summary listing of military hospitals by type and service over the 
six years of this study from FY 2001 to FY 2006.  The ten major teaching hospitals are constant 
over time except for one Air Force hospital that changed to a minor teaching hospital in 2006.  
One Air Force hospital also changed from minor teaching to non-teaching in 2001.  These 
hospitals were classified as major teaching and non-teaching, respectively, since that was their 
status for five out of the six years. 
 As can be seen in Table 1, most of the hospitals that stopped providing inpatient services 
were non-teaching and overseas hospitals. The healthcare industry trend toward decreasing 
hospitalizations and inpatient care is mirrored in the military setting.  In order to minimize cost, 
some military hospitals outsource inpatient care to local civilian medical centers and become 
super clinics or ambulatory surgery centers.  Increasing numbers of traditional surgeries and 
medical care that required hospitalizations in the past can now be performed in the outpatient 
setting or through home health care.   
 11 
Table 1 
        Types of Military Hospitals by Service over Time 
  
               2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Major Teaching Army 
 
5 5 5 5 5 5 
Air Force 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
Navy 
 
3 3 3 3 3 3 
 
        Minor Teaching Army 
 
6 6 6 6 6 6 
 Air Force 
 
4 4 4 4 4 4 
Navy 
 
5 5 5 5 5 5 
        Non-Teaching Army 
 
13 13 13 13 12 12 
Air Force 
 
12 11 11 9 9 6 
Navy 
 
7 7 6 6 6 6 
 
        Overseas Army 
 
4 4 4 4 4 4 
Air Force 
 
7 7 7 7 7 6 
Navy 
 
9 9 9 9 8 8 
 
          Total 
DOD   77 76 75 73 71 67 
 
 
Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) had a force structure of 17 brigades and three division 
headquarters.  Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (Afghanistan) had a force structure of three 
brigades and one division headquarters (Department of Defense, 2004).  The bulk of the troops 
deployed since the end of combat operations in May 2003 are Army personnel.  In general, Army 
troop rotations last 12 months and Marine troop rotations last seven months (Johnson & Tan, 
2007).  Ground troop rotation for OIF and OEF will impact productivity for the military 
hospitals.  The Navy provides medical support for the Marine Corps.  The Air Force deploys as 
Expeditionary Medical Groups to staff theater hospitals in Balad Air Base, Iraq and Bagram Air 
Base, Afghanistan.  They also support the war with mobile aeromedical staging facilities, mobile 
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surgical teams and critical care air transportation teams that manage critically injured patients 
during aeromedical evacuations.  Typically, Air Force troop deployments last four or six months 
(Svan, 2010).  Therefore, differences across the three branches of service (Army, Navy, Air 
Force) in how long personnel are deployed and away from their usual workplace may have an 
influence on productivity and quality due to skill degeneration and reintegration issues such as 
physical and mental concerns. 
 In the beginning of the war in Iraq, a large portion of medical staff that deployed with 
operational forces tended to come from the same base.  For example, when the 4
th
 Infantry 
Division at Fort Hood, Texas deployed to Iraq in 2003, many of the medical personnel from 
Darnall Army Medical Center at Fort Hood were attached to those units.  In the Navy, the 
deploying medical facilities (fleet hospitals, expeditionary medical facilities) were staffed 
primarily by one hospital (e.g., Pensacola Naval Hospital in Florida deployed 200 of the 300 
medical personnel for Fleet Hospital 3 in 2003) (Bloom & Duren, 2003).  For the Army, this 
policy of distributing deploying unit medical vacancies to “the local MTF closest to the gaining 
unit to the maximum extent possible” (Department of the Army, 1995, p. 6) was changed to the 
Regional Medical Commands in the update to the Army Regulation in 2007.  The change in 
policy mitigated the stress on specific hospitals and cast a wider net for available medical 
personnel for deployment assignments.   
 Some of the uncertainty that the hospitals must deal with depends on which units deploy.  
In 2003, hospitals located in Fort Bragg, Fort Stewart, Fort Hood, Fort Campbell and Camp 
Pendleton would have experienced increased workload from mobilized reservists and pre-
deployment processing for the major divisions and regiments preparing to deploy to the Persian 
Gulf (Department of Defense, 2003).  The hospitals located in these bases would have 
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experienced some productivity decreases as facilities attempt to quickly replace and train 
personnel (O’Brien-Pallas et al., 2006) and probably some corresponding increases in purchased 
care to compensate for loss of internal capacity as hospitals adjusted to these changes.  As the 
war has progressed, the military, including the medical community, has transformed into a more 
modular, mobile force.  The Army deploys its forces as brigade sized elements, the brigade 
combat team, instead of divisions.  The medical community has also changed to global sourcing 
for operational deployments so that the impact of deployment is spread out through many 
hospitals.  The impact of the war on each medical center and hospitals’ productivity and quality 
is likely to differ based on the number of full time equivalent (FTE) staff members deployed to 
provide medical support for combat operations or rerouted to support deployment operations at 
home station.   
 As soldiers were wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan, they were treated in the theater of 
operations by Army combat support hospitals, Navy fleet hospitals and Air Force theater 
hospitals.  Those who needed more specialized care or needed longer recovery time were 
evacuated mostly to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany (Tanielian & Jaycox, 
2008).  Once evacuees were stable enough for travel to the United States, the Deployed Warrior 
Medical Management Center at Landstuhl coordinated patient movement to stateside military 
and veterans administration hospitals based on bed status, patient needs and available 
transportation.  For example, wounded soldiers with burns were evacuated to Brooke Army 
Medical Center in San Antonio, Texas to the DOD Burn Center (Kauvar, Wolf, Wade, Cancio, 
Renz, & Holcomb, 2006).  Many extensively wounded soldiers and marines were sent to major 
teaching facilities with robust medical capabilities.  Although many were treated as inpatients, 
even more had to be processed and cared for in an outpatient status (Montgomery, Swiecki, & 
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Shriver, 2005).  Taking care of soldiers who need many nursing care hours would take away 
focus from other patients.   
 Hoge (2006) and colleagues reviewed all post deployment health assessments from May 
2003 through April 2004 to determine that 28.4% and 4.3% of returning personnel from Iraq 
were referred for medical follow-up and mental health problems, respectively.  Post deployment 
increases in workload for military hospitals are especially high for mental health services.  
Although only 4.3% of personnel deployed to Iraq were identified for mental health care 
immediately after deployment, 35% of personnel actually used mental health services in the first 
year following deployment (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 2006).  Similarly, Seal and 
colleagues (2009) found that 36.9% of veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan accessing 
clinical care in the Veterans Health Administration (VA) by the end of March 2008 had new 
mental health diagnoses.  They found that the fastest growing prevalence was Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD) diagnosis followed by depression diagnosis, and 29% of new veterans 
had at least two comorbid mental health diagnoses.  For soldiers surveyed using the PTSD 
Checklist (PCL), insomnia was the most commonly reported symptom immediately post 
deployment for soldiers who eventually were diagnosed with PTSD three months post 
deployment (McLay et al., 2010).  PTSD in both Vietnam veterans and OIF/OEF veterans are 
likely to experience lower quality of life as evinced by poorer functioning and lower objective 
living conditions and satisfaction (Schnurr et al., 2009).  
 Bliese (2007) and colleagues assessed the timing of mental health assessments for service 
members returning from combat and peacekeeping operations.  The authors found that soldiers 
were more than twice as likely to report mental health concerns during screenings 120 days 
following deployment rather than seven days (immediately) after deployment.  Such evidence 
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led to the DOD implementation of the Post Deployment Health Reassessment three to six months 
after return from combat in addition to the initial screening during reintegration for 
comprehensive identification of service members needing deployment related mental health care.  
Thomas (2010) and colleagues also added support for later care seeking behavior by noting that 
prevalence rates increased 12 months after deployment when compared to three months after 
deployment.  They also found that depending on the definition of a case for PTSD (level of 
functional impairment), the prevalence rates varied widely, ranging from 9% to 31%.  In their 
review of PTSD, Kok (2012) and colleagues found evidence for differing risk for PTSD by 
branch of service.  Army and Marine soldiers tend to have higher rates of PTSD when compared 
to their Navy and Air Force counterparts.   
 Another factor that may play into the identification of service members who need mental 
health care is the issue of anonymity.  Although the stigma associated with mental health issues 
in the military has decreased, there is still perception that mental health injuries are less valid 
than physical injuries (Wright et al., 2009).  Warner (2011) and colleagues noted in their study 
that with an anonymous survey, Army soldiers were more than twice as likely to report mental 
health problems (depression, PTSD, suicidal ideation) than on the concurrent Post Deployment 
Health Assessment.  In the anonymous survey, 12.1% of the respondents met criteria for PTSD 
or depression, but only 4.2% of the soldiers completing the Post Deployment Health Assessment 
met the criteria for PTSD or depression. 
 Deployed health care workers are exposed to many of the same environmental conditions 
as combat troops, and they may develop post traumatic stress disorder (PTDS) and depression 
once they return from deployment.  Grieger and colleagues (2007) studied risk factors for 
developing PTSD in healthcare workers who had deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.  They found 
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that exposure to wounded and dead patients did not increase the risk for PTSD, but personal 
threat of harm was a risk factor for PTSD.  The study was only conducted at one navy medical 
center, however, and the results may not be generalizable to all military healthcare workers.  
 In a review of the literature, Gibbons, Hickling, & Watts (2012) concluded that deployed 
healthcare providers have increased probability of psychological disorders due to traumatic 
events.  One of the limitations of their study was the predominance of the reviewed research was 
on Vietnam era nurses.  They noted a gap in the literature of traumatic stress on healthcare 
professionals who served during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  They also noted the need for 
research on functional impact of combat exposure, especially how deployed healthcare providers 
seek mental health care as well as their beliefs about utilization of such services.  Although not 
stated explicitly by Gibbons and colleagues, another important aspect of the functional impact is 
how traumatic stress may manifest in job performance and coping strategies of reintegrated 
healthcare providers, thereby influencing productivity and quality of military hospitals.  
 Another factor that military healthcare professionals may struggle with is compassion 
fatigue.  Compassion fatigue, a form of secondary traumatic stress, may also affect military 
hospital workers who have not been deployed but have to treat patients who have been 
extensively wounded by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Hagerty and colleagues (2011) 
identified the situations that generated stress in Army, Navy, and Air Force nurses caring for 
wounded service members were “deployment, fatigue, heavy workload, and anguish involved in 
caring for patients with severe physical and emotional trauma” (p. 88).  In their qualitative 
phenomenological study, there was a mix of nurses who had deployed as well as nurses who had 
not deployed.  Healthcare professionals may self treat to avoid the stigma associated with 
seeking help for psychological disorders which may damage their careers.  When the Army 
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instituted a policy to limit medical deployment augmentee assignments to 180-day rotations in 
January 2008, they cited degradation of complex medical skills and compassion fatigue as 
reasons for shortening deployment length for physicians, dentists and nurses (Office of the 
Surgeon General, 2008).        
 There has been descriptive research about the types of war injuries (Cancio et al., 2005; 
Fox et al., 2005; Zouris, Walker, Dye & Galarneau, 2006), experiences of deployed medical 
units (Murray et al., 2005), mental health prevalence and utilization following deployment 
(Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 2006; Hoge et al., 2004; Erbes, et al., 2007; Thomas et al., 
2010; Kok et al., 2012), disease and nonbattle injury admission rates (Wojcik et al., 2008), 
defining measures for wounded to killed ratio (Goldberg, 2010),  and experiences at one or two 
medical center (Montgomery, Swiecki & Shriver, 2005; Tentua, 2006; Kenny & Hull, 2008).  
The majority of the research about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has focused on mental health 
of service members and family members during and post deployment, especially PTSD and mild 
traumatic brain injury (Felker et al., 2008; Monson, et al., 2009; Seal et al., 2009; Schnurr et al., 
2009; Warner et al., 2011; McLay et al., 2010) Few researchers focused on the healthcare 
providers, whether deployed or in fixed facilities (Hagerty et al., 2011; Gibbons, Hickling, & 
Watts, 2012; Grieger et al., 2007).   However, there are no studies examining the performance of 
all MHS hospitals at the organizational level during a time of war, and whether and how they 
have adapted performance to the prolonged war. 
War -- An Environmental Jolt 
 Military leaders should have foreseen that deployments to the Middle East would 
increase as events escalated with Saddam Hussein in late 2002 and early 2003.  However, the 
White House, Pentagon officials, and the military forces were not properly sized and resourced 
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for the consequences of the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, especially the duration and nature of 
the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan since then (Tanelian & Jaycox, 2010).  The intent of the 
invasion was to liberate the Iraqi people from Hussein, not to occupy the country once the 
regime fell.  Although the military prepares for war and has contingencies in place for fighting 
wars, the extent of security and stability operations required in Iraq surprised many in the 
military as well as the nation as a whole.  In addition, each military hospital would not know how 
much the organization would be affected until unit deployment orders were issued.   
 The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan could be classified as an “environmental jolt” for 
military hospitals.  Meyer (1982) defined environmental jolts as “transient perturbations whose 
occurrences are difficult to foresee and whose impacts on organizations are disruptive and 
potentially inimical” (p. 515).  The loss of staff to deployment operations and increased, 
unpredictable workload due to injured service members may be quite disruptive for many 
hospitals.  The quick end to the prior major war effort in the Middle East (Operation Desert 
Shield/Storm, August 1990 to March 1991) may have lulled some military and civilian leaders 
into preparing for a much shorter, more limited disturbance.  The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have had direct impact on military hospitals through deployment of personnel and increased 
workload complexity.   
Productivity 
 From FY 2001 to FY 2006, purchased care costs increased 19.6% per year (Lurie, 2008).  
The MHS leadership focused on recapturing some of the workload back into the military 
treatment facility.  From the years 2004-2010, care purchased in the TRICARE network has 
steadily increased while care provided in military hospitals has decreased or remained constant 
(Military Health System, 2012, p. 34).  According to the Congressional Budget Office (2011), 
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DOD’s growth in spending per capita outpaced the national average (5.9% and 4.8% per year – 
purchased care and direct care, respectively – versus 1.7% per year).   
 One way of increasing productivity is by changing the funding mechanism for budgets in 
the MHS.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) allocates funds to the medical 
departments of each service--Army, Navy, and Air Force.  The services then allocate funds down 
to each hospital.  Traditionally, hospitals within the MHS have been funded based on historical 
staffing and supply budgets, which did not take into consideration changes in mission or changes 
in enrollment populations that would impact the amount of services rendered.  As missions and 
enrollment changes occur, medical facilities respond by increasing or decreasing staffing to take 
care of the beneficiaries, and as long as the workload produced justifies the increased staffing, 
the facilities obtain the increased funding in the new system.  “Health Affairs [Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)] continues to budget the military services at the 
macro-level for health care, and directed the services to increase productivity by increasing 
inpatient relative weighted product (RWP) and outpatient relative value units (RVU).  Provider 
productivity, whether increased or decreased, will guide budget adjustments within each service” 
(Kiley, 2006, p. 1).   
 Performance may be conceptualized as a combination of productivity and quality, but 
military hospitals usually evaluate quality and productivity separately.  Ozcan (2008) defines 
performance as “an appropriate combination of efficiency and effectiveness” (p. 4).  He states 
that in the performance literature, efficiency and productivity are used interchangeably. Longest 
(1977) defines productivity as “the ratio of value of services produced (output) to the value of the 
factors that have contributed to their production (inputs)” (p. 476).  Productivity is generally 
defined as the ratio of output to input (Ozcan, 2008; Rogers, 1998).  There is a positive 
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association between productivity and formalization in the form of clear policies and guidelines 
(Glisson and Martin, 1980).  
 AHRQ (2008) sponsored a systematic review of measures for efficiency in healthcare, 
conducted by the RAND Corporation, and found that depending on the stakeholder, the meaning 
of the word “efficiency” changed. In the report, “efficiency” was defined as “the relationship 
between a specific product (output) of the health care system and the resources (inputs) used to 
create the product” (AHRQ, 2008, p.13).  The AHRQ report definition of efficiency aligns to 
some of the definitions of productivity in the previously referenced literature.   
 In the economic literature, productivity, the rate at which goods or services are produced, 
is directly affected by efficiency.  Efficiency is defined as “using the minimum number of inputs 
for a given number of outputs” (Ozcan, 2008, p. 4).  With the increasing pressure to reduce costs 
and increase productivity, there have been many research endeavors in the health care sector on 
cost efficiency (Hollingsworth, 2003; Worthington, 2004; Laine et al., 2005; Fulton et al., 2008; 
Fulton et al., 2007; Hollingsworth, 2008).  Hollingsworth (2008) conducted a review of health 
care productivity and efficiency, and he notes that the economic definition of technical efficiency 
that is used in most studies is only a partial measure of overall performance.   
 One method of measuring efficiency is data envelopment analysis (DEA).  In the review 
of the literature by Hollingsworth (2008), over 60% of the studies used DEA, either solely or in 
conjunction with regression.  The AHRQ (2008) report also found that DEA was one of the 
predominant methodologies used in the peer reviewed literature about healthcare efficiency.  
DEA has been used to assess efficiency and quality (Clement et al., 2008; Valdmanis et al., 
2008; Fulton et al., 2008).  Clement and colleagues (2008) and Valdmanis and colleagues (2008) 
utilized AHRQ quality indicators, IQIs and PSIs respectively, as a measure of quality within the 
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DEA model.  Fulton and colleagues (2008) also used DEA to calculate an efficiency variable in 
order to model Army hospital cost as a function of workload, patient population, quality, access, 
and efficiency.  DEA utilizes multifactor productivity, the ratio of output to all associated inputs.  
However, DEA is based on relative rankings within a group, and the choice of inputs and outputs 
as well as peer groups change the efficiency score for facilities.  It is also a measure that military 
hospitals cannot readily compute in order to monitor their performance because the information 
and software required are not readily available at each hospital level.  In order to compare 
hospitals as decision making units (the level of analysis for DEA), data must be collected at the 
military service or DOD level.   Partial productivity, the ratio of output to one input (e.g., visits 
per physician), is a simpler measure of efficiency, but it does not capture the complexities of 
hospital care.  Although some studies use other simpler measures for efficiency, such as length 
of stay, there is no consensus within the health care industry about what components should be 
included in the measurement of efficiency (AHRQ, 2008).  The AHRQ report identified seven 
approaches to efficiency measurement in the literature and corresponding metrics for each 
approach that met their definition of efficiency.  The seven metrics are:  cost per episode, cost 
per discharge, cost per covered life, cost per health improvement, labor utilization, productivity, 
and generic prescribing rate (AHRQ, 2008, p. 22).  The objective of using the productivity 
metric was to maximize output; however, the AHRQ definition of productivity only applies to 
physician productivity.  Hospital productivity is categorized as “labor utilization” and most of 
the hospital literature used discharges or inpatient days as output (AHRQ, 2008).  Since funding 
for hospitals in the MHS is based in part on productivity, this research used productivity instead 
of cost related efficiency measures in defining organizational performance.   
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 For military hospitals, productivity has been studied more in the outpatient setting 
(physician productivity) versus the inpatient setting.  Aiello (2005) conducted a productivity 
analysis for various outpatient surgical services at one military medical center in order to 
compare the productivity results with Medical Group Management Association standards.  She 
used workload (outpatient visits + ambulatory procedure visits) divided by FTEs.  Only one 
service, Ophthalmology, outperformed the civilian sector in an academic setting at the 90
th
 
percentile.      
 The RWP is a weighted workload measure reflecting case complexity and resource use 
for inpatient care. TRICARE/Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services 
(CHAMPUS) Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) weights are used to compute RWPs for military 
hospitals. TRICARE DRG system is modeled on the Medicare Prospective Payment System 
(PPS).  Each year as Medicare PPS changes are made and published in the Federal Register, 
TRICARE DRG is updated (Federal Register, 2010).  For Medicare PPS, each DRG is assigned 
a payment weight based on the average resources used to treat Medicare patients in that DRG.  
The TRICARE DRG is modified slightly based on the average resource utilization for the 
population of hospitals submitting claims to TRICARE.  For DRG 107, coronary bypass with 
catheterization, in FY 2005, Medicare PPS DRG weight was 5.3757 and the TRICARE DRG 
weight was 5.4261 (TRICARE, 2010; Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), 
2010). With TRICARE DRG weights as the base, adjustments are made based on the patient's 
source of admission, length of stay, and discharge status.  For example, outlier thresholds for 
DRG 107, coronary bypass with catheterization, is 3 and 25 days for FY 2005 (TRICARE, 2008-
b).  A discharge with any length of stay within that range will receive the base RWP of 5.4261, 
the TRICARE DRG weight for DRG 107.  Lengths of stay outside of that range, shorter or 
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longer, will have adjustments made to the base RWP (Coventry et al., 1995). The number of 
RWPs (weighted discharges) is an appropriate productivity measure for military hospitals 
because it has face validity.   During the 2011 MHS Conference, Captain Atkinson briefed that 
the prevailing MHS pay for performance system aimed to maximize workload with a focus on 
productivity or outputs--“the volume of work that we accomplish, measured currently by 
RVUs/APCs and RWPs/Bed Days” (Atkinson, 2011, Slide 16).  It is how the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (Health Affairs)  defines productivity for inpatient services (except mental health 
services which are measured in bed days), and military hospitals receive financial bonuses for 
increasing RWPs relative to their baseline (Kiley, 2006).  However, productivity is but one 
aspect of performance, and the MHS is transitioning to a value based pay for performance 
system incorporating outcomes and patient satisfaction (Atkinson, 2011).  The quality of care, in 
both process and outcome, is an important aspect to measure to determine overall hospital 
performance. 
Quality 
 As far back as Donabedian in the 1960s, researchers have attempted to define and 
evaluate quality.  With the advances in information technology (e.g., electronic health records, 
electronic claims submissions, electronic decision support and reminder systems), use of quality 
information for contracting and public reporting has become more mainstream.  A key aspect of 
hospital performance is quality.  The Institute of Medicine (IOM) defined quality as “the degree 
to which health services for individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired health 
outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge” (Institute of Medicine, 1990, 
p. 21). With the rise of consumer report cards and public reporting of quality data, organizations 
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must focus on documenting the quality rendered in their facilities in order to survive in the 
competitive health care sector.   
 According to the IOM report, To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System (1999), 
three domains of quality are safety, provision of care following evidence-based medical 
standards, and customization to the needs of the individual.  The IOM defines a preventable 
adverse event as “an injury caused by medical management rather than the underlying condition 
of the patient … attributable to error” (Institute of Medicine, 1999, p. 28).  Preventable adverse 
events undermine the trust and confidence of patients in the health care system, and hospitals’ 
emphasis on safety would create an environment that reduces error and adverse events.  Quality 
measurement in military hospitals generally focuses on the first two domains of quality. 
 Alonso and colleagues (2006) describe the development of Team Strategies and Tools to 
Enhance Performance and Patient Safety (TeamSTEPPS), a collaborative effort between the 
DOD’s Patient Safety Program and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.  
TeamSTEPPS is an initiative to reduce medical error through a program of team training.  The 
precursors to TeamSTEPPS were MedTeams in the Army and Navy and Medical Team 
Management in the Air Force, both based on Crew Resource Management training from 
aviation.  Morey and colleagues (2002) conducted a prospective quasi-experimental evaluation 
of MedTeams using nine hospital emergency departments.  They found that, in the experimental 
group, the overall quality of teamwork and staff attitude toward teamwork increased while 
observed clinical errors decreased.  The Air Force needed a separate program due to cultural and 
structural differences in Air Force hospitals.  MedTeams and Medical Team Management 
training was implemented in the MHS from 2001 to 2003, but after program evaluations, the 
TRICARE Management Activity developed and implemented TeamSTEPPS for a unified, 
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standardized training program to increase patient safety.  By 2006, 25 inpatient and outpatient 
facilities had implemented TeamSTEPPS in the MHS (Alonso et al., 2006).  TeamSTEPPS is a 
three phase teamwork system designed for creating a culture of safety in healthcare settings, and 
it is now being implemented nationally with six civilian Team Resource Centers throughout the 
United States (AHRQ, 2012).      
 The MHS has traditionally measured quality as part of organizational quality 
improvement.  There are several studies of quality in military hospitals.  Some studies measure 
quality by type of medical care with a focus on global, MHS-wide issues of quality.  Linton and 
Peterson (2004) studied whether the presence of certain chronic conditions before pregnancy 
may increase the likelihood that a woman will deliver by cesarean section in military hospitals.  
They found that patients with diabetes, genital herpes, and hypertension were more likely to 
deliver by cesarean section, and even after adjusting for these chronic diseases, there were 
differences in observed cesarean section rates for black and Asian women when compared to 
white women.   
 Some studies are specific to one hospital.  Oliver and colleagues (1999) evaluated the 
establishment of an infusion service at one military hospital to ease patient and provider 
frustration.  They found that length of stay for organ transplant patients decreased, and staff 
productivity in the dialysis clinic increased.  Scheirman (2001) studied medication errors at a 
military academic medical center to identify root causes, an area not widely studied according to 
the IOM report, To Err is Human.  She found that ordering and transcription processes accounted 
for 65% of all medication errors reviewed for the year 2000, and she recommended actions that 
could be implemented easily in the short-term to address root problems.  Olsen and Coleman 
(2001) studied 30-day readmission rates at one military medical center to identify high risk 
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factors.  They found that patients with chronic illness and patients over 65 years old were more 
likely to be readmitted.  These studies of single military hospitals may be specific to the 
individual hospitals studied and not generalizable to the whole population of military hospitals.       
 Few studies tackle the issue from an organizational quality viewpoint.  Linton and 
colleagues (2005) studied variations in cesarean section rates in military hospitals to determine 
whether the variations were due to differences in clinical case mix.  They found that observed 
cesarean section rates were higher than predicted rates for small hospitals and teaching hospitals 
after accounting for case mix.  Beauvais and colleagues (2007) used military treatment facility 
fiscal margin to predict quality (patient satisfaction) from the Consumer Assessment of Health 
Plan Satisfaction (CAHPS).  They found a positive association between organizational financial 
strength and quality outcomes. Thus, very few studies address organizational quality in military 
hospitals, and there are none that address the effects of the war on military hospital quality.  
 Outside of the MHS, published studies of quality are plentiful.  Much work has been 
done in the measurement of quality in recent years.  CMS launched Hospital Compare, a website 
that publicly displays rates for recommended process of care measures for certain types of 
patient conditions (e.g., heart attack, heart failure, pneumonia).  The website also displays a few 
outcome measures such as 30 day risk adjusted mortality rates and readmission rates (CMS, 
2011).  Werner, Bradlow & Asch (2008) assessed whether the process measures reported on 
Hospital Compare directly increase outcomes or whether they were a proxy for unmeasured 
aspects of quality care.  Hospitals were divided into groups performing at the 75
th
 percentile in 
process measures versus hospitals performing at the 25
th
 percentile.  By comparing observed 
hospital mortality rates to expected mortality rates derived from randomized controlled studies 
and previous literature, they concluded that the difference in observed to expected mortality rates 
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was too big for the process measures to only account for the direct relationship.  They concluded 
that there were unmeasured aspects of quality care that adherence to process of care 
measurements alone could not account for in the outcome.  
 In a qualitative study, Curry and colleagues (2011) examined hospital factors that 
differentiated the top 5% versus bottom 5% of performers in 30-day risk standardized AMI 
mortality rates as reported in Hospital Compare.  They identified six domains: hospital protocols 
and practices, organizational values and goals; senior management involvement, broad staff 
presence and expertise, communication and coordination, and problem solving and learning.  Of 
these six domains, high performers differed from low performers in all but the domain of 
hospital protocols and practices.  The high performing hospitals differed from low performing 
hospitals in that they had: a) a shared vision of excellence; b) senior management was committed 
to high quality AMI care by providing financial resources as well as openly tracking quality 
performance using data; c) physician champions were involved in quality improvement and 
expertise of nurses and pharmacists were used to the fullest extent; d) effective communication 
and coordination of transitions of care were evident; and e) organizational culture valued 
innovation and learning.  This qualitative study highlights the importance of supportive 
organizational culture in improving quality in addition to the implementation of protocols and 
performance improvement practices.   
 The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) created quality indicators (QI) 
using readily available hospital administrative data to “highlight potential quality concerns, 
identify areas that need further study and investigation, and track changes over time” (AHRQ, 
2006-b).  AHRQ QIs represent well established measures that have been used in many quality 
studies (Romano, Geppert, Davies, Miller, Elixhauser, & McDonald, 2003; Rivard, Rosen, & 
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Carroll, 2006; Rivard, Elixhouser, Christiansen, Zhao & Rosen, 2010; Vartak, Ward & Vaughn, 
2008; Borzecki et al., 2010).    Organizations may use the AHRQ QI software with their own 
inpatient data to assess and monitor inpatient quality performance.   
 The AHRQ quality indicators have also been applied to international healthcare 
organizations. Drosler and colleagues (2009) found that patient safety indicators (PSI) may be 
applied to hospital data from multiple countries.  They emphasized the importance of validation 
using medical records because it was difficult to tell whether the variation was true variation in 
errors or whether the observed variation was due to variation in coding.  They also found that the 
countries with no financial incentive for accurate coding had the highest variation in PSI rates.  
These measures are not perfect, but they are much better than what was previously available.  
This study uses AHRQ QI software with MHS inpatient data to assess quality.  
 Prior research has identified a number of hospital characteristics associated with higher 
quality, especially teaching status.  Landon and colleagues (2006) found that major teaching 
hospitals performed well in treatment and diagnosis quality indicators, but they performed poorly 
in counseling and prevention indicators.  Allison and colleagues (2000) studied whether a 
hospital’s teaching status was associated with quality of care and mortality for Medicare patients 
with acute myocardial infarction.  They found that major teaching hospitals had better quality in 
three of the four indicators as well as lower mortality rates than minor and non-teaching 
hospitals.  Jha and colleagues (2005) also found that teaching status was associated with higher 
rank in AMI and congestive heart failure performance, but lower rank in pneumonia 
performance.  Vartak and colleagues (2008) also found mixed evidence regarding teaching 
status.  Major teaching hospitals, when compared to minor and non-teaching hospitals, had 
higher PSI rates for postoperative pulmonary embolism / deep vein thrombosis and postoperative 
 29 
sepsis while having lower rates of postoperative respiratory failure. Romano and colleagues 
(2003) found that urban teaching hospitals had the highest incidence of patient safety events but 
the lowest incidence of anesthesia reactions and complications, postoperative hip fracture, and 
birth trauma.    
Summary 
 In summary, military hospitals experienced an environmental jolt with the events 
following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan closely followed by Operation Iraqi Freedom has meant that the military is on a war 
footing.  There are few studies of military hospitals during wartime.  Most studies focused on 
mental health prevalence and utilization (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 2006; Tenelian & 
Jaycox, 2008; Hoge et al., 2004; Erbes, et al., 2007; Thomas et al., 2010; Heltemes et al., 2011; 
Kok et al., 2012; Seal et al., 2009) and types and epidemiology of war injuries treated (Cancio et 
al., 2005; Fox et al., 2005; Zouris, Walker, Dye & Galarneau, 2006, White, et al., 2011).  
Although the literature review identified many studies studying efficiency, productivity and 
quality in civilian hospitals, there is limited research into the same subjects in military hospitals.  
In addition, the author has not been able to identify any study examining quality and productivity 
of all military hospitals during a time of war.  Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework 
underlying the development of the hypotheses to analyze the impact of war on the productivity 
and quality of permanent military hospitals that must juggle both peacetime and wartime 
missions.   
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
 Contingency theory helps to frame the issues surrounding organizational response to the 
adaptation of military hospitals to the jolt of war.  The development of the conceptual model 
stems from the different aspects of performance in the hospital sector.  The increasing emphasis 
on measurement of outcomes in hospitals to track its performance may shed light on the context 
of structural adaptation to ensure organizational fit with the contingency environment. 
Uncertainty created by the jolt of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may lead to predicting 
organizational response.  Contingency theory is applied to develop a conceptual model that 
differentiates among organizational characteristics of military hospitals during a time of war. 
Contingency Theory 
According to Contingency Theory, “there is no one best organizational form but many, 
and their suitability is determined by the goodness of fit between organizational form and 
environment” (Scott, 2003, p. 105).  Organizations that have the best fit with their environment 
will be most effective and will achieve the best adaptation, thereby enhancing organizational 
effectiveness.   
In order to achieve the best fit, contingency factors must align with organizational 
structure (Donaldson, 2001).  Donaldson (2001) defined contingency as “any variable that 
moderates the effect of an organizational characteristic on organizational performance” (p. 7).  
Contingencies identified in the literature are environment, size and technology (Donaldson, 
1987; Child, 1972; Child, 1975).  The fit between contingency variables and organizational 
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structure affect performance, so that the extent to which levels of the organizational structure and 
the levels of the contingency match will determine how well organizations perform (Donaldson, 
2001).  Any change in the contingency variables exerts pressure for organizations to modify 
organizational structure in the long run because any misfit between the contingency variables 
and structure leads to lower performance (Donaldson, 1987; Donaldson, 2001; Child, 1972).  
According to Tosi and Slocum (1984), the key constructs in contingency theory are 
effectiveness, environment, congruency, and structure.  They state that many of the divergent 
findings in research utilizing contingency theory are due to lack of development of key concepts.  
They define effectiveness as “the degree to which an organization obtains a very limited number 
of highly desirable outcomes” (Tosi and Slocum, 1984, p. 12).  The dimensions of environment 
are uncertainty and complexity.   Congruency is the fit between the environment and the 
organizational structure, and it is the crux of contingency theory.  “Improving congruency 
between the environment and the organization supposedly leads to increased effectiveness” (Tosi 
and Slocum, 1984, p. 15).  Finally, the dimensions of organizational structure are formalization, 
centralization, and complexity.   
Organizations must achieve a balance, or congruence, between the organization’s 
external environment and internal strategies.  Internal strategies may include possessing the 
appropriate technology at the appropriate time, maintaining and hiring appropriate skill levels of 
individuals and ensuring those individuals perform the right tasks at the right time.  Donaldson 
(1987) formalized this theory and developed the structural adjustment to regain fit model 
(SARFIT), which holds that a change in contingency variables lead to “misfit” with the existing 
structure of the organization; the resulting incongruence leads to decreased performance, which 
signals to the organization that things must change and ultimately leads to organizational 
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structural adjustments to regain “fit” and eventually performance.  While Donaldson stressed that 
structure needed to be changed to fit the changes in the contingency variables, Child emphasized 
that retaining the structure of the organization may be important enough to the dominant 
coalition that instead of changing the structure in situations of misfit, the reverse happens and the 
contingency variable is modified to match structure in the strategic choice model (Donaldson, 
1987; Donaldson, 2001; Child, 1972). 
The factors that explain the best organizational form are environmental complexity and 
uncertainty (Scott, 2003). Organizational form such as centralization/decentralization of decision 
making, informal/formal structure influence the fit with the environment.  As complexity and 
uncertainty increase, smaller, decentralized and informal organizations are better able to adapt to 
rapid changes and fit better with the environment.  Smaller organizations process information 
more quickly and can react faster than large, hierarchical organizations.  Less complex 
organizations are more capable of innovation and success in unpredictable and turbulent 
environments.  On the other hand, larger, centralized and formal organizations have the resources 
and structure to respond to foreseeable changes in the environment.  As organizational size 
increases, a higher degree of routinization is required.  Larger organizations with more diverse 
personnel with a variety of skill sets and larger administrative components are more able to 
handle predictable changes in the environment.  Small organizations, however, are better able to 
deal with lack of perfect information.  Smaller military hospitals tend to be non-teaching 
hospitals, and they may be more agile in changing organizational structure.  
In relation to organizational size and organizational complexity, bigger and more 
complex organizations will take longer to reorganize and complete the changes necessary to 
regain fit with their environment (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). The complexity of military 
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hospitals differs depending on their size and the types of services offered.  Military hospitals may 
be divided into three teaching status categories:  major teaching hospitals, minor teaching 
hospitals, and non-teaching hospitals.  For this study, major teaching hospitals are defined as 
hospitals with four or more medical residency training programs, and minor teaching hospitals 
have between one and three medical residency training programs.  Major teaching hospitals have 
more operational beds and provide more medical and surgical subspecialty care.  They also have 
more nursing specialty training and allied health training programs.  Thus, size and teaching 
status is inextricably tied to complexity.  Major teaching hospitals will adapt more slowly to 
regain fit after a jolt due to its complexity in service provision and size. 
Previous studies have shown that graduate medical education programs will influence 
physician productivity (Linna, 1998; Johnson, Shah, Rechner, & King, 2008).  “An indirect 
influence of teaching and research is the loss of labour [sic] productivity in patient care: students 
and research projects absorb the time of the professional personnel.  The more students in 
relation to professionals, the more time for teaching is needed” (Linna, 1998, p. 419).  Resident 
involvement significantly reduced physician productivity by almost 2500 RVUs in a year 
timeframe within a general internal medicine practice (Johnson, Shah, Rechner, & King, 2008).  
Major teaching hospitals with many graduate medical education programs will have lower 
productivity per FTE.  They also receive most of the inpatient wounded personnel from the war 
due to their capabilities; therefore, the burden of caring for casualties returning from the war 
would fall mostly to major teaching hospitals.  Since major teaching hospitals are larger and 
more complex, they would be less able to adapt to the environmental jolts of war.  
 The degree of formalization and centralization in all military hospitals is high.  Rules and 
policies are formalized at all levels:  hospital, military branch, and DOD/Assistant Secretary of 
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Defense (Health Affairs).  Decisions such as converting to all outpatient services cannot be made 
at the hospital commander (chief executive officer) level.  Adding services or capabilities such as 
a neonatal intensive care unit or inpatient psychiatric ward starts at the hospital level, but formal 
consent must be given by the Surgeon Generals of the respective military branch.  Decisions to 
close or combine military hospitals at times must be approved by Congress.  In the Final Report 
to the President, Appendix Q:  Commission's Final Recommendations, the Defense Base Closure 
and Realignment Commission (2005) identified numerous hospitals that will either combine 
inpatient services with another military hospital (Walter Reed and Bethesda) or convert to an 
outpatient clinic (6
th
 Medical Group, McDill Air Force Base).   
 However, hospital commanders have control over some decisions that could significantly 
impact productivity and quality. While military medical personnel distribution is highly 
centralized and is determined at the military branch level, decision making authority for adding 
new civilian staff, major capital investment, and a host of other decisions (e.g., levels of 
management hierarchy, which disease and case management services to offer, contracts) are 
reserved for the hospital commander.  For example, increasing government service civilian 
personnel or contract personnel is within the discretion of the hospital commander. Although 
specific hiring and firing decisions are typically delegated to lower level managers, the hospital 
commander is ultimately responsible for overall staffing.   
 Military hospitals will have variation in their structure based on their mission, teaching 
status, service affiliation and robustness of the civilian medical services in the local area.  Larger 
medical centers will be slower to adapt their structure, and depending on the degree of 
formalization and centralization at each hospital, their organizational response to the 
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environmental jolt will likely to occur in modifications to civilian and contract staffing and 
modification of services provided.      
Theoretical/Conceptual Model 
 Drawing on contingency theory, the conceptual model for the study is presented in Figure 
1.  The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan create an environmental jolt for military hospitals and 
create uncertainty.  Uncertainty affects the ability of the organization to forecast and prepare for 
wounded soldiers who have extensive injuries that require resource heavy care (e.g., traumatic 
brain injury, amputations).  Hospitals must contend with many factors when major units or 
mobile medical facilities deploy from the base.  First, the hospital must contend with losing 
military staff and training new reservist backfill who may or may not match the skills of staff lost 
to deployment.  Second, the hospital is responsible for pre-deployment medical processing of 
deploying soldiers to ensure their medical readiness including, for example, ordering 90-day 
supply of medications, running tests, checking for pregnancy and assessing mental stability.  
Third, each brigade that deploys takes away about 4,000 enrollees who would normally receive 
care at the medical facility.  Finally, when the units return, the hospitals must conduct post-
deployment medical processing, including referring soldiers and marines for mental health care 
due to post traumatic stress or for medical care due to injuries and problems during deployment.   
 In Figure 1, Deployed FTE is the percentage of staff time attributable to deployment or 
readiness activities such as pre and post deployment processing.  The percentage of deployed 
FTEs along with the percent of wounded inpatients to the total inpatients reflects the jolt related 
uncertainty that the hospitals face because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.   
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Figure 1.  Conceptual Model of Military Hospital Performance Using Contingency Theory 
 
 
 
 The line in Figure 1 separates the environment from the organization (military hospital).  
The structure of the military hospitals may be characterized by nurse and clinician staffing.  
Workload is limited by clinician staff, nursing staff and available beds for inpatient hospitals.  
Teaching hospitals have different, more complex services and patients than regular community 
hospitals; therefore, teaching status is another measure that identifies the structure of the 
hospital.  Due to the high correlation between bed size and teaching status, only teaching status is 
reflected in the conceptual model in Figure 1.  The culture and mission of the hospitals differ 
based on the branch of armed service; hence, the services have differing organizational 
structures.   
 Military hospitals must hire new staff to cover the workload when staff are diverted to the 
readiness mission, and they also must train reservists who are activated to backfill some of the 
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military staff losses.  Due to the high degree of formalization in military hospitals and in the 
MHS, there are limits to what the individual hospitals can control in terms of structure (e.g., 
increasing staff, building additions, and adding services).  Hospitals essentially have two 
immediate organizational responses: hire contractors to replace deployed staff to keep services in 
the hospital or to allow care to be purchased in the surrounding hospitals.  When making this 
decision, the hospital leadership may take into account the costs and benefits of contracting for 
personnel in their specific geographic area and labor market versus the capacity and capabilities 
of surrounding civilian hospitals.  The costs and benefits evaluated include non-financial 
concerns, such as time involved in monitoring and enforcing contracts, as well as financial 
concerns.  For example, if there is excess capacity in local civilian hospitals and the medical 
workforce in the area is not as robust, the hospital may choose to purchase care instead of trying 
to contract personnel. However, if there is little or no excess capacity or relatively unique 
medical services required by returning soldiers, the hospital may be forced to contract for 
personnel they can use to provide these services directly even if that would be more difficult to 
do.  Finally, over time, hospitals have some ability to adjust their response and structure, given 
changes in deployments, wounded soldiers and based on information about its performance. As 
shown in Figure 1, the percentage of deployed staff and the percent of wounded soldiers 
subsequently affect the organizational response in determining the number of additional contract 
personnel hired.   
 The second immediate response of sending care out into the network, the amount of 
purchased care, may impact quality by providing a release valve for overwhelmed hospitals.  
However, the availability of medical evacuation assets within the Air Force makes it is more 
likely for inpatients, especially Active Duty personnel, to be sent to a different military hospital 
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beyond the local commuting area for care.  Unlike outpatient care that has to be kept in the local 
area where the patient resides, inpatient care may be sent to a military hospital that either 
specializes in the care or has the capacity.  After initial consideration, the amount of purchased 
care was eliminated as a possible variable due to the inability to attribute care purchased in a 
multi-service market area to a specific hospital.  For example, Wilford Hall, an Air Force 
Hospital, and Brooke Army Medical Center are located in and share service to the San Antonio 
metropolitan area.  It is impossible to determine whether the purchased inpatient care should 
have been serviced by Wilford Hall or Brooke Army Medical Center.  Only the first 
organizational response of hiring contract personnel is kept in the model.   
 The fit between structure (and organizational response) and jolt related uncertainty 
should influence hospital performance in quality and productivity.  The evidence of whether 
there is fit between the structure and the environment is the performance metrics of high 
production of RWPs (productivity) and low incidence of adverse events (quality).  The hospitals 
will use feedback on performance to constantly strive to regain fit. 
Hypotheses Development 
 Utilizing contingency theory as related to the study’s conceptual model investigating the 
impact the jolt of war had on the military hospitals, this analysis addresses  two research 
questions.  First, how did productivity and quality change overall over the years 2001-2006 in 
military hospitals after the jolt of war?  Essentially, what effect did the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq have on the performance of military hospitals as they responded to the jolt of war in the 
early years? Second, do productivity and quality trends differ over the years 2002-2006 by type 
of hospital?   
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 Landon and colleagues (2006) found that teaching status is associated with higher quality 
in treatment of AMI but not CHF and pneumonia.  Using factor analysis, they determined two 
underlying domains of quality across all three conditions:  1) treatment and diagnosis and 2) 
counseling and prevention.  Major teaching hospitals performed well in the quality indicator 
domain of treatment and diagnosis, although they performed poorly in the quality indicator 
domain of counseling and prevention.  Landon and colleagues used quality indicators that were 
reported to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (Hospital Compare) and Joint 
Commission, not AHRQ quality indicators.  Allison and colleagues (2000) also found that major 
teaching hospitals had lower mortality rates than minor and non-teaching hospitals in the 
treatment of acute myocardial infarction.  They used actual mortality rates 30 days, 60 days, 90 
days and two years post hospitalization, unlike the AHRQ IQI 15 which is the expected AMI 
mortality rate used for this study.  In addition, Fine and colleagues (2002) identified teaching 
status to be positively associated with timely initial antibiotic administration in elderly patients 
with pneumonia.  Studies have also shown a relationship between teaching status and quality 
utilizing PSIs (Rivard, et al., 2010; Vartak et al., 2008). Similar to Landon and colleagues 
(2006), Vartak and colleagues (2008) found evidence that major teaching hospitals performed 
better in one quality indicator (PSI 11- postoperative respiratory failure) while performing worse 
in others (PSI 12 - postoperative pulmonary embolism or deep vein thrombosis and PSI 13- 
postoperative sepsis).  Rivard and colleagues (2010) also uncovered mixed results in the 
relationship between patient safety indicators and teaching status in both VA hospitals and 
nonfederal hospitals. Major teaching hospitals had a higher likelihood of adverse events in both 
VA hospitals and nonfederal hospitals in iatrogenic pneumothorax and infection due to medical 
care.  However, minor teaching VA hospitals and major teaching nonfederal hospitals had lower 
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likelihood of mortality in low mortality DRGs.  Although evidence is mixed, Rivard and 
colleagues found that teaching status was the structural characteristic most associated with PSIs.  
Thus, for this study, it is anticipated that those military hospitals with a greater number of 
residency programs would exhibit better quality compared with those with fewer residents and 
the following hypothesis is tested: 
Hypothesis 1:  The average level of quality across the six years will be higher for 
major teaching hospitals than minor and non-teaching hospitals. 
 
For military hospitals, major teaching hospitals are all medical centers with residency 
training programs.  Graduate medical education programs have been shown to decrease staff 
physician productivity (Linna, 1998; Johnson, Shah, Rechner, & King, 2008).  Major teaching 
hospitals with many graduate medical education programs may have lower staff physician 
productivity, but that loss may be countered by the workload generated by the higher volume of 
residents at the facilities.  Major teaching hospitals receive most of the inpatient wounded 
personnel from the war due to their enhanced capabilities.  The vast majority of casualties 
returning from the war would be treated by major teaching hospitals.  The complexities of 
running graduate education programs and providing tertiary, advanced therapies combined with 
receiving severely wounded patients requiring extensive care would make the larger, major 
teaching hospitals less able to adapt to the environmental jolts of war than the smaller minor and 
nonteaching hospitals.   In terms of the rate of change for adaptation and adjustment to the jolt, 
the following two hypotheses are tested:  
Hypothesis 2: Major teaching hospitals’ rate of change in quality will be slower 
than minor and non-teaching hospitals’ rate of change in quality. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Major teaching hospitals’ rate of change in productivity will be 
slower than minor and non-teaching hospitals’ rate of change in productivity.  
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Although most of the severely wounded soldiers are transported to major teaching hospitals, 
wounded soldiers also are sent to minor teaching hospitals.  Nursing workload is affected by 
patient acuity, patient turnover, and patient characteristics; nursing workload in turn moderates 
the relationship between nurse staffing and patient outcomes (Duffield et al., 2011; Park et al., 
2012).  The number of wounded soldiers who tend to have higher acuity and more complex 
injuries would influence hospital performance in quality.  As the percentage of wounded soldiers 
increase, quality will decrease.  Therefore, for this study, it is anticipated that as hospitals’ 
wounded inpatient admissions increase as a percentage of total admissions, hospitals would 
demonstrate worse quality and the following hypothesis is tested: 
Hypothesis 4:  There will be an inverse relationship between the percentage of 
wounded soldiers and quality. 
 
When OEF and OIF began in 2001 and 2003, respectively, Army troop rotations lasted 12 
months and Marine troop rotations lasted seven months.  Air Force troop deployments lasted less 
than six months while the Navy troops on ships deploy for six months at a time.  The differences 
across the three branches of service (Army, Navy, Air Force) in how long personnel are 
deployed and away from their usual workplace may have an influence on productivity and 
quality due to skill degeneration and reintegration issues such as physical and mental concerns.  
The Army also has the highest number of troops deployed and medical assets necessary to 
support the troop deployments among the three services.  The Army also has the greatest number 
of major and minor teaching hospitals in comparison to the other services, thereby having more 
hospitals that see relatively more complex patients and that provide more complex services.  
Therefore, the ability of the Army hospitals to adapt their structure to the jolt related uncertainty 
by changing staffing levels (see conceptual model in Figure 1) to improve performance is slower 
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than the Navy and Air Force hospitals.  Thus, in terms of the rate of change for adaptation and 
adjustment to the jolt by service affiliation, the following two hypotheses are tested:  
Hypothesis 5: Army hospitals’ rate of change in productivity will be less rapid 
than Air Force and Navy hospitals’ rate of change in productivity.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Army hospitals’ rate of change in quality will be less rapid than Air 
Force and Navy hospitals’ rate of change in quality. 
 
As OEF and OIF have progressed, the military and the medical community has transformed 
into a more modular, mobile force.  Global sourcing for operational deployments has spread the 
impact of losing staff to deployments through many hospitals.  The impact of the war on each 
hospital’s productivity and quality is likely to differ based on the number of FTEs deployed as a 
result of providing medical support for combat operations (jolt related uncertainty).  Deployment 
of staff creates a situation of staff turnover, which negatively influences productivity while new 
staff is recruited and trained (Hayes, et al., 2006).  Studies have shown that nursing turnover 
creates hospital inefficiencies; increased hospital operating costs; and decreased nursing home 
quality (Alexander et al., 1994; O'Brien-Pallas et al., 2006; Castle & Engberg, 2005).  O’Brien-
Pallas and colleagues (2006) found that the highest direct cost due to turnover was incurred by 
hiring temporary replacements while the highest indirect cost was the result of decreases in 
productivity.  Thus, it is expected that as hospitals’ percentage of deployed staff increases, 
hospitals would suffer from increasing turnover and demonstrate decreasing productivity and the 
following hypothesis is tested: 
Hypothesis 7:  There will be an inverse relationship between percentage of 
deployed FTEs and productivity. 
 
The deployed staff must be replaced either by contractors or reservist personnel who need unit 
specific training before assuming duties in the military hospitals. 
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Summary 
 In this chapter, the theoretical framework of contingency theory as it relates to military 
hospital response to an environmental jolt was used to develop study hypotheses in support of 
the research question.  The characteristics of the hospital such as teaching status and branch of 
armed service will influence how fast the organization would be able to adapt and influence 
measures of performance such as quality and productivity.  The jolt related uncertainty of 
deployed FTEs and wounded patients will influence hospital quality and productivity.   
 Chapter 4 specifies the research methods to include research design, data sources, 
specific variables and methodology for the analysis.  Retrospective panel data utilizing 
multilevel analysis is the basis for the analytic approach.  How different characteristics of the 
military hospital influence the pattern of performance in quality and productivity over the course 
of adapting to the war is analyzed.   
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Chapter 4: Methods 
 
 
 
 The purpose of this research is to determine what impact the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have had on the productivity and quality of United States military hospitals over the 
fiscal years 2001-2006.  How productivity and quality changed over the years and what effect the 
wars have had on the productivity and quality of military hospitals was explored.  The 
uncertainty created by the jolt of war and the organizational adaptation arising from changing its 
structure in the attempt to move from misfit to fit with the environment will influence 
organizational performance in productivity and quality.  This chapter lays out the methods used 
to test military hospital performance using a Contingency Theory framework. 
Design 
 This study is a retrospective panel analysis where military hospitals (unit of analysis) are 
observed over a six-year period (fiscal years 2001 to 2006).  Two strengths of panel analysis are 
the ability to study dynamic relationships and to model heterogeneity among observed units 
(Frees, 2004).  In longitudinal analysis, data are collected over multiple time periods from the 
same organizations; therefore, there is bound to be some degree of correlation in the dependent 
variable.  One of the drawbacks of longitudinal studies is attrition. For the current study, ten 
hospitals either converted to outpatient clinics and stopped providing inpatient services or closed 
entirely.  The number of military hospitals changed from 77 in fiscal year 2001 to 67 hospitals at 
the end of fiscal year 2006 (Table 1), creating an unbalanced data set for this study.  Multilevel 
analysis is one of several methodologies that use all available information in unbalanced data 
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sets to determine the effects due to time between groups instead of decreasing sample size to 
hospitals with data in all time periods.  A fixed effects model may also be applied to unbalanced 
panels after application of within or first difference transformations; however, time constant 
explanatory variables of interest (structural variables such as branch of service and teaching 
status) would not be estimated.  Since the change in quality and productivity over the six-year 
period while accounting for hospital structural characteristics is the focus of this study, 
multilevel mixed effects models are utilized.  Fixed effects models are also applied for sensitivity 
analyses of the results. 
Data 
 The MHS Data Repository (MDR) is the primary database for the current research.  
MDR contains population, clinical, and financial data for all care provided in the MHS 
(TRICARE Management Activity, 2010).  MDR has enrollment and eligibility information, 
inpatient and outpatient claims for purchased care, inpatient, outpatient, and laboratory 
information for direct care, medication information (obtained from mail order, retail pharmacy, 
and military pharmacy) and workload and cost accounting information (TRICARE Management 
Activity, 2010).  Data from numerous information systems in the MHS are funneled to the 
centralized MDR, enabling corporate decision making at all levels: hospital, region, branch of 
service and MHS.  
 Annual data for each military hospital are used for analysis.  Since budget cycles and 
major policy changes occur in fiscal years, a one-year period begins on October 1
st
 and ends on 
September 30
th
 of the following calendar year.  This study covers six fiscal years, FY 2001 to FY 
2006, from October 1, 2000 through September 30, 2006.  This timeframe was chosen to provide 
data before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan began for comparison and enough years afterwards 
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to demonstrate evidence of adaptations.  This timeframe covers one year before the war began in 
Afghanistan (October 2001) and three years after the war began in Iraq (March 2003).  This 
study period ends before the surge in mid 2007 that stabilized Iraq.  Data from MDR address one 
of the limitations from some studies where indirect and direct nursing care hours are combined 
since staffing hours for inpatient, outpatient and administrative cost centers are separated.  The 
validity and reliability of military electronic patient data are comparable to other large civilian 
information systems (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 2006).   
 The Virginia Commonwealth University Institutional Review Board determined that this 
research met the criteria for exempt status.  An approved Data Use Agreement is on file with the 
TRICARE Management Activity Privacy Office for this study. 
Sample. 
 The sample is based on all military hospitals of the three branches of the armed forces 
from FY 2001 to 2006.  Of the total 77 military hospitals at the beginning of the study (Table 1), 
seven hospitals stopped offering inpatient services between 2001 and 2003.  Since most of the 
impact of war should be after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, hospitals without at least three full 
years of data were eliminated from the sample.  The final sample consisted of 70 hospitals in 
2001 going down to 62 in 2006.  One Air Force hospital was devastated by Hurricane Katrina 
near the end of FY 2005 so it provided no data for FY 2006, resulting in 61 hospitals in 2006 
(See Table 2).  Each hospital in each year becomes an observation, resulting in 407 total 
observations for the multilevel model. 
Dependent variables. 
 The variables for the study were designed based on the theoretical framework of 
contingency theory.  The dependent variables, productivity and quality, represent the  
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Table 2. 
        Types of Military Hospitals by Service over Time for Sample (Productivity) 
               2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Major Teaching Army 
 
5 5 5 5 5 5 
Air Force 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
Navy 
 
3 3 3 3 3 3 
 
        Minor Teaching Army 
 
6 6 6 6 6 6 
Air Force 
 
4 4 4 4 4 3 
Navy 
 
5 5 5 5 5 5 
 
        Non-Teaching Army 
 
12 12 12 12 12 11 
Air Force 
 
8 8 8 8 6 5 
Navy 
 
6 6 6 6 6 5 
 
        Overseas Army 
 
4 4 4 4 4 3 
Air Force 
 
6 6 6 6 6 5 
Navy 
 
9 9 9 8 8 8 
 
          Total DoD  70 70 70 69 67 61 
 
performance construct. The following sections describe the construction of the measures used to 
represent productivity and quality in the analysis.   Table 3 delineates measures for the constructs 
and variables in the conceptual model (Figure 1).  The “Level” column in Table 3 applies to 
multilevel models, and it is explained in more detail in the Statistical Modeling section. 
 Productivity. 
 Productivity was measured by the number of RWPs (weighted discharges) per 1000 
patient bed days.  Since bigger hospitals with more occupied beds will have higher numbers of 
RWPs, the standardized ratio of RWPs generated per 1000 patient bed days is a more appropriate 
comparison among hospitals.  The number of admissions or discharges is a common productivity 
measure for hospitals (Harrison & Coppola, 2007; Fulton et al., 2007; Mandiakis et. al., 1999).  
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Table 3      
Constructs and Variables for Productivity and Quality Models 
Levela Construct Variable Definition / Measure 
Dependent Variables     
  
Performance: 
Productivity 
Productivity  
(PROD) 
Inpatient workload: Number of RWP weighted 
discharges per year per 1000 patient bed days 
  Performance: 
Quality 
Quality Indicators 
(PSI1) (PSI3) (PSI12) 
(PSI14) (PSI15)   
(IQI20) (IQI23) (IQI33)  
Quality Indicators: Observed number of adverse 
events per year 
Independent Variables 
  
Productivity/Quality Model 
Level 1 Uncertainty  
(UNCER) 
Wounded discharges 
(WOUND) 
Percent wounded discharges:   
War related discharges (DX codes E990.0-E999.1) / 
Total discharges x 100% 
Level 1 Structure 
(STRUC) 
RN staffing  
(RN) 
RN FTEs in inpatient areas: Annual RN FTEs per 
1000 patient bed days 
Level 1 Structure 
(STRUC) 
Clinician Staffing 
(CLIN) 
Clinician FTEs in inpatient areas:   
Annual physician FTEs and advanced practice nurse 
FTEs per 1000 patient bed days 
Level 1 Organizational 
Response 
(RESP) 
Contractor FTE 
(CONTRACT) 
Contract FTEs in inpatient areas: Number of 
contract FTEs per 1000 patient bed days 
Level 1 Uncertainty  
(UNCER) 
Deployed staff 
(DEPLOY) 
Percent deployed FTE:  
Deployed FTE / RN and Clinician FTE x 100% 
Level 1   Time 
 (TIME) 
Fiscal Year:   
2001=0; 2002=1; 2003=2; 2004=3; 2005=4; 2006=5 
Level 2 Structure 
(STRUC) 
Teaching Status 
(MINOR)  (NON) 
 
Type of Hospitalb 
(MINOR)  (NON) (OS) 
Major Teaching (4 or more residency programs), 
Minor Teaching (1-3 residency programs),         
Non-Teaching (0 residency programs):   
Major Teaching =referent; MINOR = 1 if Minor 
Teaching, 0 otherwise; NON = 1 if Non-Teaching, 0 
otherwise; OS=1 if Overseas, 0 otherwise 
Level 2 Structure 
(STRUC) 
Branch of Service 
(NAVY) (AF) 
Branch of Armed Service (Army, Navy, Air Force):   
Army = referent; NAVY = 1 if Navy, 0 otherwise;  
AF = 1 if Air Force, 0 otherwise 
Quality Model Additional Variablesc 
Level 1 Control 
Variable 
Case Mix Index  
(CMI) 
Case Mix Index:   
Annual RWP weighted discharges / Annual 
discharges 
Level 1 Control 
Variable 
Offset Factor 
(OFFSET) 
Poisson offset factor:   
Ln (expected number of adverse events at each 
hospital per year) 
   
Note.  
a
 Level 1 variables are time and time varying variables; Level 2 variables are 
time-invariant variables 
b
 Type of Hospital includes teaching status categories plus overseas hospitals 
c
 Additional time varying control variables only needed for quality model 
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Some advantages of using RWPs are:  it is readily available in military medical databases 
already accounting for resource intensity, and it has been used in many previous research studies 
on military hospitals.  A disadvantage is that the measure is unique to the military; therefore, it is 
not easy to use this measure to make comparisons outside the military setting.   
 Quality (quality indicators). 
 AHRQ’s set of quality indicators (QI) include inpatient quality indicators (IQI), patient 
safety indicators (PSI), pediatric quality indicators (PDI) and prevention quality indicators (PQI).  
IQIs are measures of inpatient mortality for medical conditions and surgical procedures, 
utilization of procedures, and volume of procedures.  These measures reflect quality in hospitals.  
PSIs are measures that identify potential in-hospital complications and adverse events following 
surgeries, procedures, and childbirth.  PDIs combine the function of IQIs and PSIs into one set of 
measures for children.  PQIs help to identify hospital stays that are ambulatory care sensitive 
conditions (AHRQ, 2006-a).  The AHRQ PSIs are easily implemented, low-cost, and relatively 
free of collection bias (Rivard, Rosen, & Carroll, 2006).  Due to these advantages, PSIs may be a 
good tool for senior managers to use in overall system trending and benchmarking in healthcare.  
AHRQ QIs are used widely in the healthcare industry for quality improvement, and they were 
determined to have face and content validity (Hussey et al., 2006).  
 Claims data from MDR was used with AHRQ Quality Indicator Software to calculate 
each hospital’s expected and observed adverse events for each IQI and PSI to assess quality for 
inpatient service.  Observed adverse events for each PSI and IQI became the dependent variables 
for the quality mixed effects models.  To decrease bias, all admissions that were transferred out 
to another acute care hospital or transferred in from another acute care hospital were eliminated 
prior to calculating expected and observed adverse events using the AHRQ QI software.  Patients 
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that were transferred to another hospital and eventually died would skew the mortality rates for 
care that was rendered at the original and receiving hospitals.   
 Although IQIs (mortality rates) are good outcome measures for many hospitals, deaths 
are rare occurrences for many military hospitals.  The military hospitals tend to serve a younger, 
healthier population than general civilian acute care hospitals.  Therefore, there are many 
hospitals with zero expected adverse events for the IQIs, and many of the mortality indicators 
could not be used in this study.  The list of PSIs and IQIs utilized in the study are listed in Table 
4.  PSIs and IQIs were excluded if not enough hospitals had patients at risk for the indicator 
being measured.  Specifically, for each IQI and PSI, hospitals in each fiscal year with an 
observed denominator of patients at risk less than 15 were excluded.  Then, if fewer than half of 
the observations (hospitals per year) were left for each quality indicator, the indicator was 
excluded from analysis.  Most of the mortality quality indicators (IQI 8-19) were excluded from 
the analysis due to too few hospitals having adequate patients at risk.  The total number of 
observations for the remaining IQIs and PSIs varied between 230 and 407.  In addition, if very 
few hospitals had non-zero occurrence or very low expected occurrence, these hospitals were 
excluded.  For example, PSI 13 (Postoperative Sepsis) was eliminated because the range of 
observed counts was zero to two and only 12 of 171 occurrences for all six years were non-zero.  
All hospitals had an expected count of less than one for PSI 13.  PSI 13 has been identified as 
occurring too infrequently in hospitals to be a good measure of patient safety in a previous study 
(Hussey et al., 2009).      
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Table 4   
  AHRQ Quality Indicators Used in the Study 
   
Category 
Quality 
Indicator 
Indicator Name 
Patient 
Safety PSI 1 Complications of Anesthesia 
 
PSI 3 Decubitus Ulcer 
 
PSI 12 Postoperative Pulmonary Embolism or Deep Vein 
Thrombosis 
 
PSI 14 Postoperative Wound Dehiscence 
 
PSI 15 Accidental Puncture or Laceration 
Inpatient 
Quality IQI 20 Pneumonia Mortality Rate 
 
IQI 23 Laparoscopic cholecystectomy Rate 
  IQI 33 Primary Cesarean delivery Rate 
 
Independent variables. 
 Wounded discharges. 
 Discharges are coded with specific E diagnosis codes to specify external causes of injury.  
The war related E codes are between E990.0 and E999.1 (TRICARE Management Activity, 
2011-c).  Discharges with these E codes were designated as wounded discharges to calculate the 
percent of wounded discharges per hospital per year. 
 Staff FTEs. 
 The Medical Expense & Performance Reporting System (MEPRS) is a system for 
collecting uniform medical personnel, expense, and workload data for all three services.  MEPRS 
provides the FTE reporting data stored in the MDR.  All inpatient work centers have MEPRS 
codes beginning with the letter “A.”  The system distinguishes by type of personnel; therefore, 
RN FTEs assigned to inpatient areas will have work hours captured under the “A” work center.  
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The variable RN Staffing only includes inpatient RN FTEs.  For this analysis, RN Staffing is 
calculated as FTEs per 1000 patient bed days for each hospital.     
 In contrast, it is more difficult to determine clinician assignment to inpatient areas.  
Clinicians for this study are defined as physicians and physician extenders such as physician 
assistants and advanced practice nurses (i.e., clinical nurse specialists, certified nurse 
anesthetists, midwives and nurse practitioners).  For the variable Clinician Staffing, 
differentiating between outpatient and inpatient staff is more difficult because the clinicians are 
only assigned to outpatient clinics.  Inpatient work hours should be attributed to the inpatient 
work centers for the amount of time clinicians work in inpatient areas, but the actual number of 
clinician FTEs for each hospital may be understated.  To appropriately account for clinicians 
who would work in inpatient areas, outpatient clinics were matched by broad categories (i.e., 
medicine, surgery, and obstetrics and gynecology) to inpatient counterparts to exclude clinicians 
working in areas who would not have work hours attributed to inpatient work centers.  Clinician 
Staffing includes both inpatient and outpatient clinician FTEs.  Clinician Staffing is also 
calculated as FTEs per 1000 patient bed days for each hospital. 
 The variable Contractor FTE includes all clinician and nursing staff contractors assigned 
to inpatient areas.  Similar to Clinician Staffing, contractor clinicians also include physician 
extenders.  Unlike permanent clinicians, however, contractor clinician hours are attributed 
correctly to the work center where they work, so time spent working in inpatient work centers 
are clearly distinguishable from time spent in outpatient work centers.  For this study, RN 
Staffing and Contractor FTE only include inpatient staff FTEs whereas Clinician Staffing 
includes both inpatient and outpatient FTEs.   
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 Deployed FTE. 
 MEPRS codes beginning with the letter “G” designate readiness related activities in 
support of the military mission rather than patient care.  Specifically, “GA” codes designate 
administrative requirements involved in implementing readiness activities at the medical 
facilities such as administering immunizations for deploying military members.  The “GD” 
account captures the deployed status of personnel from the military facilities (Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Health Affairs, 2008).  The number of FTEs in these two “G” 
accounts is the number of Deployed FTEs for the effect of war on each hospital.  Only deployed 
clinicians, RNs and paraprofessionals are included for the Deployed FTE variable.  Personnel 
such as dentists and administrators were excluded from Deployed FTE since they would not 
influence productivity and quality of inpatient services.  The denominator is the total clinician, 
RN, and paraprofessional FTEs for the hospital in the inpatient and outpatient service areas.   
Excluded are ancillary, dental, veterinary and administrative areas.  The outpatient areas were 
included because it is impossible from the data system to determine where the deployed FTEs 
were assigned prior to readiness related activities.      
 Teaching status. 
 As discussed earlier in the literature review, teaching status was categorized as major 
teaching for hospitals with four or more GME programs, minor teaching for hospitals with one to 
three GME programs, and non-teaching for hospitals with no GME.  The major teaching 
hospitals were selected as the referent category.  There are 19 hospitals that are located overseas 
in FY 2001.  Initially, location was considered as a control variable separately, but since all the 
overseas hospitals are non-teaching and Landstuhl Regional Medical Center has the capabilities 
and services more like teaching hospitals except GME, classifying overseas hospitals as a subset 
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of the non-teaching hospitals within the teaching status variable seemed to be the most 
parsimonious.  Therefore, the variable Teaching Status is represented by three dummy variables 
MINOR, NON and OS, representing minor teaching hospitals, non-teaching hospitals, and 
overseas hospitals, respectively.  Major teaching hospital is the reference category.  For clarity, 
when OS is included, the term “types of hospitals” is used.  The term “teaching status” refers 
only to major teaching, minor teaching and non-teaching categories. 
 Branch of service. 
 The variable Branch of Service is the military hospital’s branch of the Armed Service: 
Army (referent), Navy (NAVY) or Air Force (AF).  The variable Branch of Service is 
represented by two dummy variables, NAVY and AF.  Since most military hospitals are 
affiliated with the Army, Army was chosen as the reference category.      
 Case mix index. 
The annual case mix index (CMI) for military hospitals is computed by taking the total 
RWP weighted discharges produced divided by the total number of discharges for the year. The 
CMI represents the case complexity of the average inpatient for each hospital.  The CMI for each 
hospital is included as a control variable, and it is only used in the quality models to control for 
complexity.   
Statistical Modeling 
 Observations over a six-year period are nested within hospitals; therefore, to determine 
the effects of the independent variables on productivity and quality, two different multilevel 
mixed effects models were used.  The type of statistical model is determined by whether the 
dependent variable is productivity or quality.  A random coefficient modeling (RCM) framework 
is used to test the continuous variable, Productivity.  To test the quality variables, multilevel 
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mixed effects Poisson regression is used because the quality variables are counts of deaths or 
adverse events.  All models were analyzed using Stata version 11.   
Multilevel modeling. 
 This section discusses the multilevel model in general.  Since multilevel modeling is 
predominately used with continuous dependent variables, the methodology is discussed using the 
variable Productivity.  To determine change in productivity over the period 2001-2006, a 
multilevel mixed effects model using a random coefficient modeling (RCM) framework was 
used with the continuous dependent variable.  According to Bliese and Ployhart (2002), “RCM 
models estimate growth parameters on the available data and do not require complete data from 
all respondents” (p. 383).  Assuming the attrition of study hospitals is exogenous, the multilevel 
model is an appropriate technique to utilize for this study.  Observations over multiple time 
periods (Level 1) are nested within hospitals (Level 2).  The two-level mixed effects model 
examines three things:  1) change patterns of the dependent variable over time for the sample as 
a whole; 2) organizational differences in overall levels of the dependent variable; and 3) 
organizational differences in change patterns of the dependent variable over time (Bliese & 
Ployhart, 2002).  The general multilevel mixed effects model using Raudenbush and Byrk (2002) 
notation is: 
 (Level 1)   Yij = π0j + π1j(TIMEij) + rij  
 
 (Level 2)   π0j = β00 + u0j 
   π1j = β10 + u1j 
 
where  
π0j = organization j’s initial intercept 
π1j = organization j’s initial slope 
rij = residual error 
β00 = the average initial intercept across organizations  
β10 = the average initial slope across organizations  
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u0j = residual intercept, the difference between organization j’s intercept and the average 
intercept across organizations 
u1j = residual slope, the difference between organization j’s slope and the average slope across 
organizations  
TIMEij = time period i for organization j 
 
Once combined, the multilevel equation is: 
 
Yij = [β00 + β10 (TIMEij)] + [u0j + u1j (TIMEij) + rij] 
 
The first bracketed term is the fixed effects part of the model, and the second bracketed term is 
the random effects part of the model. 
Level 1 model structure. 
 It is important to determine the relationship of the dependent variable with regard to time 
in Level 1 of the model before adding any other variables.  In order to correctly model the 
pattern of observations over time, the relationship between each dependent variable and time 
were analyzed without any other predictors.  Empirical growth plots for each hospital are created 
using a scatterplot of time versus the dependent variable.  The change trajectory is the fitted 
trend line of each scatterplot .  Figure 2 depicts the productivity change trajectories on an 
empirical growth plot for the first 12 hospitals, giving a quick sense of the different patterns and 
rates of change in productivity.  Hospital #8 has a rate of increase while Hospital #10 has a rate 
of decrease in productivity.  In a similar vein, different patterns and rates of change are evident 
for hospitals in the quality indicators, IQIs (Figure 3: change trajectories for IQI 20-Pneumonia 
Mortality) and PSIs (Figure 4: change trajectories for PSI 15-Accidental Puncture or Laceration).  
For all three types of dependent variables, it is important to specify parameters that will account 
for the different change patterns over time for each organization; therefore, the slopes and 
intercepts are allowed to randomly vary for each military hospital with mixed effects models.   
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Figure 2.  Empirical Growth Plots of 12 Military Hospitals’ Productivity from 2001 to 2006. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Empirical Growth Plots of 12 Military Hospitals for Inpatient Quality Indicator 20-
Pneumonia Mortality from 2001 to 2006. 
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Figure 4.  Empirical Growth Plots of 12 Military Hospitals for Patient Safety Indicator 15-
Accidental Puncture or Laceration from 2001 to 2006. 
 
 
Table 5 contains the results of the comparisons of linear time models and quadratic time 
models for each dependent variable.  The significance of the relationship between time and the 
dependent variable was determined by examining the parameter estimates and the corresponding 
z values. TIME was significantly related to all inpatient quality indicators and productivity, but 
TIME was only significantly related to Postoperative Wound Dehiscence (PSI 14) and 
Accidental Puncture and Laceration (PSI 15) for the patient safety indicators.  To compare the 
linear model with the quadratic model, the deviance of the simpler model versus the more 
complex model was determined using a log likelihood test (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002).  Only two 
of the quality variables (PSI 12-Postoperative Pulmonary Embolism or Deep Vein Thrombosis 
and PSI 14-Postoperative Wound Dehiscence) and productivity had significant TIME
2
 
components when analyzing the deviance via change in χ2 from the linear model to the quadratic  
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Table 5 
         Comparison of Linear and Quadratic Time Models for Dependent Variables 
 
           
      Linear Time Model   
Quadratic Time 
Model   Change in χ2 
      z p   z p   χ2 p 
IQI 20 TIME 
 
-5.30 < 0.01 
 
-2.44 0.02 
   
 
TIME
2 
    
0.93 0.35 
   
 
Log Likelihood 
 
8.17 < 0.01 
 
8.14 < 0.01 
 
0.85 0.36 
IQI 23 TIME 
 
2.74 < 0.01 
 
0.24 0.81 
   
 
TIME
2 
    
0.57 0.57 
   
 
Log Likelihood 
 
62.04 < 0.01 
 
61.94 < 0.01 
 
0.33 0.57 
IQI 33 TIME 
 
8.85 < 0.01 
 
2.23 0.03 
   
 
TIME
2 
    
0.26 0.79 
   
 
Log Likelihood 
 
727.26 < 0.01 
 
727.28 < 0.01 
 
0.07 0.79 
PSI 1 TIME 
 
0.81 0.42 
 
-0.89 0.37 
   
 
TIME
2 
    
1.17 0.24 
   
 
Log Likelihood 
 
63.69 < 0.01 
 
63.55 < 0.01 
 
1.35 0.25 
PSI 3 TIME 
 
1.27 0.20 
 
0.73 0.46 
   
 
TIME
2 
    
-0.39 0.70 
   
 
Log Likelihood 
 
245.74 < 0.01 
 
245.68 < 0.01 
 
0.15 0.70 
PSI 12 TIME 
 
1.26 0.21 
 
2.84 < 0.01 
   
 
TIME
2 
    
-2.59 < 0.01 
   
 
Log Likelihood 
 
427.20 < 0.01 
 
428.23 < 0.01 
 
6.79 <0.01* 
PSI 14 TIME 
 
-1.99 0.05 
 
2.33 0.02 
   
 
TIME
2 
    
-3.00 < 0.01 
   
 
Log Likelihood 
 
0.13 0.36 
 
0.19 0.33 
 
9.7 <0.01* 
PSI 15 TIME 
 
2.07 0.04 
 
-0.97 0.33 
   
 
TIME
2 
    
1.62 0.11 
   
 
Log Likelihood 
 
501.05 < 0.01 
 
500.17 < 0.01 
 
2.62 0.11 
PROD TIME 
 
-5.87 < 0.01 
 
-1.22 0.22 
   
 
TIME
2 
    
-0.49 0.62 
     Log Likelihood   443.97 < 0.01   448.40 < 0.01   4.66 0.03* 
Note: *Change in χ2 is significant 
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model.  To minimize the number of coefficients estimated in the models, the linear time model 
(Yij = π0j + π1j(TIMEij) + rij) instead of the quadratic time model (Yij = π0j + π1j(TIMEij) + 
π2j(TIME
2
ij) + rij) was used for the Level 1 structure in all analyses. Then, time-varying 
predictors (listed in Table 3 as Level 1) are added to determine the final Level 1 model, and time 
invariant predictors (listed in Table 3 as Level 2) are added to Level 2 for the final model.   
Productivity multilevel model. 
 Along with TIME, the Level 1 time varying variables from Table 3 (Wounded 
Discharges, RN Staffing, Clinician Staffing, Deployed FTE and Contract FTE) are included in 
the equation for Level 1.  The hypothesized equation for the final Level 1 model for productivity 
is: 
(Level 1)   PRODij =  π0j + π1j(TIMEij) + π2j(WOUNDij)  + π3j(RNij) + π4j(CLINij) +   
  π5j(DEPLOYij) + π6j (CONTRACTij) + rij 
 
 After the Level 1 model structure is determined, time invariant explanatory variables (Xj) 
identified as predictors in the Level 2 model in Table 3 are added to the Level 2 part of the model 
to determine if organizations have different intercepts (π0j) and slopes for TIME (π1j). 
(Level 2)    π0j = β00 + β01 (Xj) + u0j 
   π1j = β10 + β11 (Xj) + u1j 
   π2j = β20 
   π3j = β30  
   π4j = β40  
   π5j = β50 
   π6j = β60 
 
Adding branch of service variables (AF and NAVY)  and teaching status (MINOR, NON, OS) 
for Xj in Level 2 and substituting into the Level 1 linear time model for productivity [PRODij = 
π0j + π1j(TIMEij) + rij] derives the following equation: 
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 PRODij = β00 + β10 (TIMEij) + β01 (AFj) + β02 (NAVYj) + β03 (MINORj) + 
  β04 (NONj) + β05 (OSj) + β11 (AFj) (TIMEij) + β12 (NAVYj) (TIMEij) +  
  β13 (MINORj) (TIMEij) + β14 (NONj) (TIMEij) + β15 (OSj) (TIMEij) + 
  β20 (WOUNDij)  + β30 (RNij) + β40 (CLINij) + β50 (DEPLOYij) + 
  β60 (CONTRACTij) +[u0j + u1j (TIMEij) + rij] 
 
The Level 2 predictors create cross product parameters with time in growth models (multilevel 
mixed effects models with time) once hospital level time invariant predictors were included in 
the slope for TIME (π1j).     
Quality multilevel models. 
 To determine change in quality over the period 2001-2006, a Poisson regression mixed 
effects model is used.  Poisson regression is appropriate when examining count data, such as 
mortality and adverse events in hospitals where the distribution is generally not normally 
distributed.  Applying ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with count data is not appropriate 
because the predicted values may fall below zero (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Akien, 2003).  
Although there are numerous zero observations, the zero-inflated Poisson regression model is not 
appropriate because hospitals that do not have patients at risk for the quality indicator (structural 
zeros) are already excluded from the analysis for that quality indicator.   
 Individual discharge information for all military hospitals are analyzed using AHRQ QI 
software to determine observed adverse events and expected adverse events for each quality 
indicator.  The natural log of the expected number of adverse events for each hospital (OFFSET) 
is included in the Poisson regression equation as an offset factor, and the regression coefficient is 
constrained to equal 1.  The offset factor is necessary to account for the differences in exposure 
of each hospital to provide context for the observed adverse events.    
 The general Poisson regression equation for the expected number of events is: 
 E(Yij | Xij) = exp (Xij Π) 
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where X is a set of explanatory variables and Π is a set of parameters.  The model for the mixed 
effects Poisson regression is: 
jjj
jjj
ijijjjij
X
X
rTIME
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10)log(






 
 
where : 
π0j =  overall average intercept 
π1j = overall average slope 
Xj = vector of explanatory variables 
Β01 and β11 = parameter vectors 
j0 = hospital specific random intercept 
j1 = hospital specific random coefficient 
 
The models for quality also include the time varying control variable, case mix index (CMI), in 
Level 1 to account for hospitals that have more severe patients.  Hence, the final quality equation 
is: 
 E(QUALij|Xij )= exp{OFFSET + β00+ β10 (TIMEij) + β01 (AFj) + β02 (NAVYj) +  
  β03 (MINORj) +β04 (NONj) + β05 (OSj) + β11 (AFj) (TIMEij) +  
  β12 (NAVYj) (TIMEij) +β13 (MINORj) (TIMEij) + β14 (NONj) (TIMEij) +  
  β15 (OSj) (TIMEij) +β20 (WOUNDij) + β30 (RNij) + β40 (CLINij) + β50 (DEPLOYij)+ 
  β50 (DEPLOYij) +β60 (CONTRACTij) + β70 (CMIij) +[ζ0j + ζ1j (TIMEij) + rij]} 
 
The hypotheses from Chapter 3 align with the parameters in the Productivity and Quality 
Multilevel Models presented according to Table 6.  
Summary 
 In summary, this study is a retrospective panel analysis of military hospital performance 
over a six-year period (FY 2001 to FY 2006) to determine how productivity and quality changed 
over the years as a result of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  To determine change in productivity, 
a multilevel mixed effects model using a random coefficient modeling framework is used.  For 
changes in quality, a set of multilevel mixed effects Poisson regression models are used.   
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Table 6     
Hypotheses and Parameter Linkage by Dependent Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
(Parameter) 
Hypothesis 
Productivity     
 Teaching Status    
(β13, β14) 
Hypothesis 3: Major teaching hospitals’ rate of 
change in productivity will be slower than minor 
and non-teaching hospitals’ rate of change in 
productivity.  
 Branch of Service 
(β11, β12) 
Hypothesis 5: Army hospitals’ rate of change in 
productivity will be less rapid than Air Force and 
Navy hospitals’ rate of change in productivity. 
 Deployed FTE 
(β50) 
Hypothesis 7:  There will be an inverse 
relationship between percentage of deployed FTEs 
and productivity. 
Quality     
      Teaching Status 
 (β03, β04) 
Hypothesis 1:  The average level of quality across 
the six years will be higher for major teaching 
hospitals than minor and non-teaching hospitals. 
 Teaching Status  
(β13, β14) 
Hypothesis 2: Major teaching hospitals’ rate of 
change in quality will be slower than minor and 
non-teaching hospitals’ rate of change in quality. 
 Wounded Discharge 
(β20) 
Hypothesis 4:  There will be an inverse 
relationship between the percentage of wounded 
soldiers and quality.  
  Branch of Service  
(β11, β12) 
Hypothesis 6: Army hospitals’ rate of change in 
quality will be less rapid than Air Force and Navy 
hospitals’ rate of change in quality.  
 
Chapter 5 presents descriptive analysis of the variables in the study and the results of the 
multilevel analyses of the productivity and quality models presented in this chapter.   
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Chapter 5: Results 
 
 
 
 The purpose of this research was to determine what impact the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have had on the productivity and quality of United States military hospitals over the 
fiscal years 2001-2006.  How productivity and quality changed over the years and what effect the 
wars have had on the productivity and quality of military hospitals were explored.  In particular, 
the research aimed to answer whether productivity and quality trends differ by type of hospital. 
Descriptive Analysis 
 A total of 407 observations over six years were included in the study as described earlier 
and is reflected in Table 2.  Descriptive statistics for the sample are listed in Table 7.  Statistics 
are divided by time varying Level 1 independent variables, time invariant Level 2 independent 
variables and dependent variables.  For the time varying variables, the percentage of wounded 
discharges to total discharges (WOUND) range from some hospitals having zero to at least one 
hospital having as much as 14.72% of the discharges from wounded service members.  Nurse 
staffing (RN) ranges from 0.34 RN FTEs per 1000 patient bed days to 18.06 RN FTEs per 1000 
patient bed days; however, an average of 6.42 RN FTEs per 1000 patient bed days signals that 
there are some hospitals that are outliers and have much more staffing than the average hospital.  
Clinician staffing (CLIN) follows a similar pattern as nurse staffing with a range of 2.74 to 36.3 
FTEs per 1000 patient bed days with an average of 9.16 FTEs.  The average percentage of 
deployed staff (DEPLOY) was 8.13%.  Finally, the average case mix index (CMI) is 0.74, 
signaling that on average, military hospitals do not treat very complex patients.   
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Table 7 
     Descriptive Statistics for Sample (FY 2001 to FY 2006) 
           M SD Min Max n 
Level 1 Independent Variables (Time Varying) 
  
 
WOUND 0.20 1.24 0 14.72 407 
 
RN 6.42 2.74 0.34 18.06 407 
 
CLIN 9.16 4.65 2.74 36.30 407 
 
DEPLOY 8.13 11.30 0 88.07 407 
 
CONTRACT 0.78 1.20 0 9.85 407 
  CMI 0.74 0.25 0.38 1.66 407 
Level 2 Independent Variables (Time Invariant) 
  
 
AF 0.28 
    
 
NAVY 0.33 
    
 
(Army-Referent) 0.39 
    
 
MINOR 0.22 
    
 
NON 0.37 
    
 
OS 0.27 
      (Major-Referent) 0.14         
Dependent Variables
a
 
     
 
PROD 263.18 55.24 146.52 493.52 407 
 
IQI 20 2.71 3.83 0 18 263 
 
IQI 23 41.06 30.60 10 161 230 
 
IQI 33 95.92 95.33 0 587 346 
 
PSI 1 0.34 0.90 0 8 407 
 
PSI 3 6.49 12.22 0 82 362 
 
PSI 12 4.34 10.06 0 75 405 
 
PSI 14 0.40 0.85 0 6 372 
  PSI 15 10.20 16.82 0 83 407 
Note.  
a
 Observations are excluded if hospitals in a specific year did not have 
at least 15 patients at risk for the quality indicator.  Some quality indicators 
have sample sizes less than 407 for the mixed effects model. 
 
 Table 7 also shows that in the total sample of 407 hospital observations, 28% were Air 
Force (AF), 33% were Navy and 39% were Army.  The annual productivity (PROD) of these 
military hospitals varies greatly.  Although the average productivity is 263.18 RWPs per 1000 
bed days, the range is from 146.52 RWPs to 493.52 RWPs per 1000 bed days.  Interestingly, 
both the lowest and highest productivity values are for non-teaching hospitals.  The difference in 
productivity seems to be unrelated to the type of hospital.   
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Figure 5 illustrates that the average RWPs per 1000 bed days are similar for all four types 
of hospitals, but non-teaching hospitals have the greatest variability in productivity.  Most of the 
observations for hospital productivity fall between 200 and 400 RWPs, but many non-teaching 
hospitals have productivity values that fall below 200 or above 400 RWPs.  The variability in 
productivity for major teaching hospitals is the smallest among the different types of hospitals.  
The average trend for each type of hospital was constant or slightly increased (Figure 5).  The 
trend for overseas hospitals may have been influenced by the productivity for Landstuhl 
Regional Medical Center, which increased dramatically after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 
because all wounded service members from Iraq and Afghanistan were evacuated to Landstuhl to 
be stabilized before being evacuated to the continental United States.   
Figure 5.  Scatterplot and Trend of Productivity over Time by Type of Hospital. 
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 With respect to the quality variables in Table 7, all hospitals had patients at risk for only 
two of the quality indicators, PSI 1 (Complications of Anesthesia) and PSI 15 (Accidental 
Puncture or Laceration).  The number of hospitals with patients at risk for the rest of the quality 
indicators (IQI 20, IQI 23, IQI 33, PSI 3, PSI 12, and PSI 14) differed with the fewest hospital 
observations (230) for laparoscopic cholecystectomy (IQI 23) and the most hospital observations 
(405) for postoperative pulmonary embolism or deep vein thrombosis (DVT, PSI 12).  
Observations were excluded if hospitals in a specific year did not have enough patients at risk 
(less than 15 patients) for the quality indicator, thereby accounting for sample sizes less than 407 
in Table 7. 
 Summary statistics are presented in Table 8 by type of hospital.  Reinforcing the graphs 
in Figure 5, Table 8 shows that the average productivity is similar regardless of teaching status.  
The average productivity across the six years of the study for major, minor and non-teaching 
hospitals ranged from 264.94 to 274.46 RWPs per 1000 bed days.  Overseas hospitals’ average 
productivity was slightly lower at about 250 RWPs.  However, for the quality indicators, there 
were big differences between the average adverse events for major teaching hospitals when 
compared to the average for non-teaching and overseas hospitals.  In particular, major teaching 
hospitals had an average number of observed adverse events in the 20s for PSI 3 (Decubitus 
Ulcer) and PSI 12 (Postoperative Pulmonary Embolism or DVT) while the average number of 
adverse events were less than 1 for non-teaching and overseas hospitals.  Also of note are the 
relatively few number of overseas hospital observations for IQI 20 (Pneumonia Mortality) and 
IQI 23 (Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy), n=22 and n=28, respectively.           
 Summary statistics are also presented in Table 9 by branch of service.  For productivity, 
all three services produce comparable average RWPs per 1000 bed days, but the Air Force  
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Table 8 
              Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables by Type of Hospital 
  
                  Major Teaching   Minor Teaching   Non-Teaching   Overseas 
 
M  SD n   M  SD n   M  SD n   M  SD n 
PROD 266.16 34.54 60 
 
274.46 43.44 89 
 
264.94 69.20 149 
 
249.92 49.29 109 
IQI 20 7.83 3.79 60 
 
2.15 2.80 87 
 
0.43 1.12 94 
 
0.73 0.98 22 
IQI 23 64.93 36.76 60 
 
41.29 26.83 78 
 
21.83 9.39 64 
 
33.18 22.90 28 
IQI 33 258.88 145.84 42 
 
116.28 76.99 89 
 
69.71 33.27 112 
 
40.39 26.58 103 
PSI 1 1.27 1.65 60 
 
0.44 0.89 89 
 
0.11 0.37 149 
 
0.07 0.30 109 
PSI 3 28.03 15.68 60 
 
5.87 6.75 89 
 
0.59 0.97 137 
 
0.83 1.56 76 
PSI 12 23.18 15.46 60 
 
2.81 3.68 89 
 
0.54 0.92 149 
 
0.35 0.90 107 
PSI 14 1.38 1.39 60 
 
0.42 0.67 89 
 
0.15 0.47 147 
 
0.09 0.29 76 
PSI 15 41.87 22.29 60   10.08 8.01 89   3.18 3.38 149   2.46 6.18 109 
 
Table 9 
           Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables by Branch of Service 
                        
 
Army 
 
Air Force 
 
Navy 
 
M  SD n   M  SD n   M  SD n 
PROD 261.60 51.39 160 
 
280.84 73.84 113 
 
250.17 33.59 134 
IQI 20 2.96 4.22 122 
 
3.13 4.16 64 
 
1.97 2.66 77 
IQI 23 39.24 27.39 114 
 
31.41 16.69 61 
 
55.53 42.03 55 
IQI 33 102.66 78.69 131 
 
64.84 38.52 92 
 
112.01 130.22 123 
PSI 1 0.48 0.90 160 
 
0.17 0.53 113 
 
0.32 1.10 134 
PSI 3 7.52 13.76 160 
 
5.14 7.63 93 
 
6.12 12.94 109 
PSI 12 6.24 13.53 160 
 
3.03 6.07 113 
 
3.17 7.15 132 
PSI 14 0.42 0.91 159 
 
0.36 0.78 99 
 
0.40 0.83 114 
PSI 15 13.71 19.04 160   6.54 8.17 113   9.09 18.61 134 
 
hospitals (M=280.84) have slightly higher average productivity than hospitals in its sister 
services.  Unlike some of the average differences when grouped by type of hospital, there are no 
glaring average differences in quality indicators when grouped by branch of service.  In general, 
Air Force hospitals have fewer average adverse events than Army and Navy hospitals.      
 Since longitudinal data are unlikely to be independent, intraclass correlation coefficients 
(ICC) were estimated to determine the strength of the nonindependence.  The ICC (ρ) gives an 
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indication of the proportion of variance in each dependent variable that lies between hospitals 
and may be explained by the characteristics of the organization (Singer & Willett, 2003).  The 
high ICCs listed in Table 10 demonstrate that most of the variance lies between hospitals.  The 
variance between hospitals is generally much greater than the variance within hospitals at 
different time periods for most of the dependent variables in Table 10.  For productivity, ρ =.841, 
meaning that 84.1% of the total variation was due to differences between hospitals which may be 
attributable to hospital level characteristics.  Only complications of anesthesia (PSI 1) and 
postoperative wound dehiscence (PSI 14) have ICCs close to the 0.5 range, meaning that there is 
about as much variance within hospitals from year to year as there is between hospitals for PSI 1 
and PSI 14.  In the summary statistics by type of hospital shown in Table 8, the range of average 
observed adverse events for PSI 1 and PSI 14 is between 0.07 and 1.38, which are extremely low 
numbers of observed adverse events for these patient safety indicators and explains why there 
may be as much variation between hospitals as there is within hospitals.  When ICCs are low, a 
multilevel model may not be necessary because there is only a small proportion of the variance 
that is accounted for by differences in the higher level units, in this case difference between 
hospitals. 
Table 11 depicts the change in time varying (Level 1) independent variables over the six 
years studied.  The average percentage of wounded discharges (WOUND) and the average 
percentage of deployed staff (DEPLOY) increase after the wars in Iraq began in FY 2003.  There 
is also a corresponding increase in the average number of contractor FTEs (CONTRACT) since 
2003.  The average number of nurses (RN) and clinicians (CLIN) do not show a clear pattern 
corresponding to the FY2003 start of the War in Iraq.  
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Table 10 
      Variance and Intraclass Correlation Coefficients for Dependent Variables 
  
       Outcome 
Variable 
Variable Description 
Between 
Variance  
Within   
Variance  
ICC (ρ) 
PROD RWP Adjusted Discharges  
per 1000 Bed Days 
2724.01   514.83 
  
0.8410 
IQI 20 Pneumonia Mortality Rate 11.33  3.25 
 
0.7773 
IQI 23 Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy 
Rate 
788.28  125.45 
 
0.8627 
IQI 33 Primary Cesarean Delivery 
Rate 
8701.00  397.71 
 
0.9563 
PSI 1 Complications of Anesthesia 0.43  0.37 
 
0.5326 
PSI 3 Decubitus Ulcer 131.20  14.45 
 
0.9008 
PSI 12 Postop Pulmonary Embolism or 
DVT 
92.85  6.70 
 
0.9327 
PSI 14 Postop Wound Dehiscence 0.31  0.40 
 
0.4368 
PSI 15 Accidental Puncture or 
Laceration 
253.46  26.94 
 
0.9039 
 
Table 11 
             Descriptive statistics for independent variables over six fiscal years 
   
    Fiscal 
Year 
WOUND   DEPLOY   CONTRACT   RN   CLIN 
M SD   M SD   M SD   M SD   M SD 
2001 0.00 0.00 
 
1.24 1.85 
 
0.56 1.31 
 
5.97 2.43 
 
8.94 4.15 
2002 0.00 0.00 
 
3.26 4.19 
 
0.60 1.15 
 
6.14 2.58 
 
9.25 4.62 
2003 0.12 0.70 
 
10.30 10.52 
 
0.80 1.12 
 
6.41 2.88 
 
9.37 4.82 
2004 0.31 1.69 
 
8.60 11.05 
 
0.89 1.20 
 
6.56 3.09 
 
9.53 5.61 
2005 0.40 1.88 
 
10.56 10.40 
 
0.90 1.14 
 
6.49 2.77 
 
9.06 4.51 
2006 0.39 1.61   15.96 17.25   0.98 1.23   7.01 2.62   8.76 4.10 
 
 Correlation analysis of the independent and dependent variables was conducted to ensure 
there was not excessive collinearity among the variables in the models.  Correlation coefficients 
greater than 0.5 were considered highly correlated.  Table 12 depicts the correlation matrix for 
the independent variables.  Only nurse staffing (RN) and clinician staffing (CLIN) were highly 
correlated (r = 0.65), which makes sense that hospitals that have more inpatients will have both  
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Table 12
TIME WOUND RN CLIN DEPLOY CONTRACT CMI AF NAVY MINOR NON OS
AF x 
TIME
NAVY  
x TIME
MINOR 
x TIME
NON x 
TIME
OS x 
TIME
TIME 1
WOUND 0.130* 1
RN 0.112 -0.079 1
CLIN -0.011 -0.168* 0.652* 1
DEPLOY 0.399* 0.021 -0.034 -0.209* 1
CONTRACT 0.125 -0.019 0.084 0.043 0.107 1
CMI -0.007 0.244* -0.104 -0.087 -0.026 0.163* 1
AF -0.026 -0.094 -0.140* 0.381* -0.190* -0.141* 0.041 1
NAVY 0.006 -0.076 0.275* 0.079 -0.318* -0.025 -0.213* -0.434* 1
MINOR 0.012 -0.073 -0.176* -0.114 0.044 0.009 0.015 -0.023 0.009 1
NON -0.016 -0.103 0.110 0.151* 0.213* 0.181* -0.256* 0.019 -0.153* -0.402* 1
OS -0.007 0.115 0.243* 0.165* -0.239* -0.359* -0.268* 0.059 0.178* -0.320* -0.460* 1
AF x TIME 0.311* -0.070 -0.038 0.334* -0.110 -0.053 0.025 0.770* -0.335* -0.015 -0.003 0.055 1
NAVY x TIME 0.379* -0.043 0.202* 0.046 -0.169* -0.032 -0.171* -0.331* 0.763* 0.013 -0.119 0.129* -0.255* 1
MINOR x TIME 0.308* -0.053 -0.096 -0.062 0.136* 0.056 0.016 -0.010 0.004 0.774* -0.320* -0.255* 0.099 0.116 1
NON x TIME 0.384* -0.066 0.141* 0.065 0.403* 0.204* -0.213* -0.008 -0.111 -0.302* 0.752* -0.345* 0.115 0.018 -0.241* 1
OS x TIME 0.322* 0.177* 0.211* 0.150* -0.122 -0.281* -0.196* 0.048 0.138* -0.248* -0.356* 0.774* 0.172* 0.275* -0.197* -0.268* 1
Note.  *p<0.01
Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables
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          Table 13 
         
Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables with Dependent Variables 
   
  Dependent Variables 
  PROD PSI 1 PSI 3 PSI 12 PSI 14 PSI 15 IQI 20 IQI 23 IQI 33 
TIME 0.0789 0.0193 0.0135 0.0013 -0.1026 -0.0019 -0.0979 -0.0389 0.0589 
WOUND 0.0321 0.078 0.0873 0.1501* 0.0499 0.2311* -0.0116 0.1779* 0.0025 
RN 0.3900* -0.1742* -0.3303* -0.2585* -0.2477* -0.3080* -0.2934* -0.3250* -0.3584* 
CLIN 0.4531* -0.2039* -0.2941* -0.2962* -0.1998* -0.3575* -0.2838* -0.3369* -0.4303* 
DEPLOY 0.0175 0.0029 -0.0766 -0.0447 -0.1124 -0.0316 -0.1279 -0.1253 0.0222 
CONTRACT 0.1248 0.1163 0.2502* 0.1630* 0.1056 0.1726* 0.1919* 0.1942* 0.2060* 
CMI 0.4575* 0.2775* 0.6649* 0.7092* 0.4768* 0.7001* 0.6753* 0.2449* 0.3494* 
AF 0.1984* -0.1198 -0.0649 -0.0814 -0.0262 -0.1351* 0.0614 -0.1898* -0.1965* 
NAVY -0.1651* -0.0161 -0.0197 -0.0813 0.0023 -0.0463 -0.1241 0.2657* 0.1255 
MINOR 0.1082 0.057 -0.0291 -0.0809 0.0101 -0.0038 -0.1033 0.0056 0.1258 
NON 0.0242 -0.1984* -0.3770* -0.2889* -0.2392* -0.3175* -0.4461* -0.3910* -0.1905* 
OS -0.1453* -0.1808* -0.2390* -0.2383* -0.1844* -0.2787* -0.1569 -0.0961 -0.3798* 
AF x TIME 0.2078* -0.0921 -0.0337 -0.0766 -0.0235 -0.1029 -0.0079 -0.1656 -0.1412* 
NAVY x TIME -0.1361* -0.0436 -0.0049 -0.0518 -0.0148 -0.0495 -0.1202 0.1846* 0.12 
MINOR x TIME 0.1408* 0.0463 -0.0165 -0.0665 -0.0376 -0.0214 -0.1025 -0.0764 0.1057 
NON x TIME 0.0179 -0.1229 -0.2812* -0.2203* -0.1981* -0.2361* -0.3571* -0.3174* -0.1353 
OS x TIME -0.0704 -0.1267 -0.1852* -0.1795* -0.1413* -0.1981* -0.1162 -0.0559 -0.2856* 
Note. *p<0.01 
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greater numbers of nurses and clinicians to take care of those inpatients.  Both variables were 
kept in the model.  Table 13 lists the correlations of the independent variables to the dependent 
variables.  Since each dependent variable was analyzed separately, there was no need to 
determine bivariate correlations among the dependent variables.  Only case mix index (CMI) was 
highly correlated with some of the quality dependent variables (PSI 3, PSI 12, PSI 15, IQI 20) 
with a correlation coefficient greater than 0.5.  The quality dependent variables were the number 
of observed events, and hospitals with higher case mix index may have more adverse events due 
to the higher acuity of their patients.  However, in the Poisson regression model used for the 
quality dependent variables, an offset factor based on expected adverse events accommodates the 
raw number of observed events.  Therefore, the variable CMI was retained in the quality models. 
Mixed Effects Models 
Productivity. 
 The analytic results of the random coefficient, multilevel mixed effects model for 
productivity are listed in Table 14.  For time varying predictors, the percentage of wounded 
discharges (β20 = 5.983, p<0.001) and the number of clinician staffing (β40 = 4.135, p<0.001) was 
significantly associated with productivity at the initial time period, FY 2001.  Since wounded 
discharges were defined as percent of wounded discharges to total discharges, a one percentage 
point increase in wounded discharges was associated with an increase of almost six RWPs per 
1000 bed days.  For staffing, a one unit increase in clinician staffing (1 FTE/1000 bed days) was 
associated with an increase of 4.135 RWP/1000 bed days.  Military hospitals with higher 
percentage of wounded patients and more clinician staff had higher levels of productivity.  
 For time invariant variables, neither branch of service nor teaching status were 
significantly associated with productivity.  However, overseas hospitals (β05 = -46.94, p<0.01)  
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Table 14 
  Multilevel Mixed Effects Model for Productivity 
     Productivity 
  Coefficient Std. Err. 
INTERCEPT (β00)  237.711 14.342 
TIME (β10)  1.456 2.619 
WOUND (β20)  5.983*** 1.757 
RN (β30)  1.701 1.184 
CLIN (β40)  4.135*** 0.82 
DEPLOY (β50)  -0.155 0.166 
CONTRACT (β60)  -3.563 2.268 
AF (β01)  1.730 12.727 
NAVY (β02)  -8.220 12.066 
MINOR (β03)  -12.252 16.733 
NON (β04)  -26.428 15.474 
OS (β05)  -46.94** 16.622 
AF x TIME (β11)  1.140 2.469 
NAVY x TIME (β12)  -5.336* 2.332 
MINOR x TIME (β13)  5.240 2.741 
NON x TIME (β14)  3.433 2.763 
OS x TIME (β15)  2.295 2.922 
   Random Effects Parameters     
 
Variance Std. Err. 
Slope (τ11 ) 33.5684 10.8119 
Intercept (τ00) 1463.6690 309.2659 
Covariance (τ01) 28.4129 41.2215 
Level 1 Residual (σ2) 364.9662 32.3247 
      
Likelihood Ratio Test
a
 χ2(3) = 380.62*** 
  Observations (n) 407 
Hospitals (J) 70 
Note.  
a 
Likelihood Ratio Test compares current mixed effects model 
with standard linear regression with no random effects. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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had significantly lower average productivity than major teaching hospitals.  The significant result 
for the interaction of branch of service with time indicate that the rate of change differs for Navy 
hospitals (β12 = -5.336, p<0.05) when compared to Army hospitals even though the average rate 
of change in productivity over time (β10) is not significant.  Navy hospitals have 5.336 fewer 
RWP/1000 bed days for each year increase in time.  
 The random error components seem reasonable.  Variance in the intercept (τ00) is 1464 
while the variance in the slope (τ11) is 33.6. These error variances summarize between hospital 
variability in productivity change for initial status (TIME=0 or FY 2001) and growth rates after 
controlling for branch of service and type of hospital.  The smaller the error variances, the more 
these time invariant variables account for changes in productivity over time.  The large error 
variance in the intercept (τ00 = 1464) indicates that the organizational characteristics, branch of 
service and type of hospital, do not capture much of the variability in productivity between 
hospitals.  There remains a lot of residual variance that may be explained by additional Level 2 
predictors.  The Level 1 residual variance (σ2) of 365 summarizes the within hospital variability 
of productivity from each hospital’s own time trend.  
Quality. 
 Inpatient quality indicators.   
Table 15 lists the results of the mixed effects Poisson regression for IQIs.  The regression 
coefficients and corresponding standard errors for each IQI along with the exponentiated 
regression coefficients are presented.  For pneumonia mortality (IQI 20), two variables were 
significant.  First, clinician staffing (β40 = -0.08, p<0.05) was associated with lower pneumonia 
mortalities (IQI 20).  An increase in clinician staffing of one unit (1 FTE/1000 bed days) is 
associated with 8% fewer pneumonia mortalities per year, holding all other variables constant.      
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Table 15
Multilevel Mixed Effects Models for Quality: Inpatient Quality Indicators
Coefficient (SE)exp(coeff.) Coefficient (SE) exp(coeff.) Coefficient (SE)exp(coeff.)
TIME (β10) -0.07 (0.05) 0.93 0.02 (0.01) 1.02 0.03 (0.02) 1.03
WOUND (β20) -0.07 (0.06) 0.94 0.01 (0.01) 1.01 -0.01 (0.01) 0.99
RN (β30) 0.10 (0.05) 1.10 -0.01 (0.01) 0.99 0.004 (0.01) 1.00
CLIN (β40) -0.08*(0.03) 0.92 -0.001 (0.01) 1.00 0.01 (0.01) 1.01
DEPLOY (β50) -0.004 (0.01) 1.00 0.001 (0.002) 1.00 0.001 (0.001) 1.00
CONTRACT (β60) -0.09 (0.08) 0.92 0.05*(0.02) 1.05 0.01 (0.01) 1.01
CMI (β70) 0.11 (0.31) 1.11 -0.17*(0.08) 0.84 0.2 (0.14) 1.22
AF (β01) 0.39 (0.22) 1.48 0.18**(0.06) 1.20 0.01 (0.07) 1.01
NAVY (β02) -0.03 (0.22) 0.97 0.17**(0.05) 1.19 0.19**(0.07) 1.21
MINOR (β03) -0.21 (0.2) 0.81 0.08 (0.06) 1.08 0.02 (0.09) 1.02
NON (β04) 0.11 (0.32) 1.12 0.09 (0.08) 1.09 0.11 (0.1) 1.12
OS (β05) -0.67 (0.57) 0.51 0.29***(0.08) 1.34 0.07 (0.1) 1.07
AF x TIME (β11) -0.11 (0.06) 0.89 0.001 (0.02) 1.00 0.01 (0.02) 1.02
NAVY x TIME (β12) -0.01 (0.07) 0.99 -0.001 (0.02) 1.00 -0.02 (0.02) 0.98
MINOR x TIME (β13) 0.04 (0.05) 1.04 -0.01 (0.01) 0.99 0.002 (0.02) 1.00
NON x TIME (β14) -0.22*(0.11) 0.80 -0.01 (0.02) 0.99 -0.01 (0.02) 0.99
OS x TIME (β15) 0.27 (0.15) 1.31 -0.03 (0.02) 0.97 0.01 (0.02) 1.01
Constant (β00) 0.14 (0.41) 1.16 -0.03 (0.11) 0.97 -0.53 (0.17) 0.59
Random Effects Parameters
Variance Std. Err. Variance Std. Err. Variance Std. Err.
Slope (τ11 ) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.002 0.001
Intercept (τ00) 0.043 0.041 0.002 0.002 0.031 0.008
Covariance (τ01) -0.001 0.007 <0.001 <0.001 -0.004 0.002
Observations (n)
Hospitals (J)
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
IQI 20
263 230 346
IQI 23 IQI 33
Pneumonia Mortality
Laparoscopic 
Cholecystectomy
Primary Cesarean 
Delivery
47 42 59
χ
2
(3) = 478***χ
2
(3) = 7.01 χ
2
(3) = 0
Note.  
a 
Likelihood Ratio Test compares current mixed effects model with standard Poisson regression 
with no random effects.
Likelihood Ratio Test
a
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  Second, the significant interaction between non-teaching hospitals and time (β14 = -0.22, 
p<0.05) indicates that non-teaching hospitals had a different rate of change than major teaching 
hospitals for pneumonia mortality.  Other factors being constant, non-teaching hospitals had a 
25% decline in pneumonia mortality per year while major teaching hospitals only had 6.8% 
decline in pneumonia mortality per year.  However, since non-teaching hospitals had very low 
expected deaths per year, close to zero, this significant difference in rate of change may not be 
practically significant. 
 Four independent variables were significant for laparoscopic cholecystectomy (IQI 23).  
For contract staff (β60 = 0.05, p<0.05), a one unit increase in contract staff (1 FTE/1000 patient 
bed days) is associated with 5% increase in laparoscopic cholecystectomies per year.  It is 
interesting to note that both Air Force (β01 = 0.18, p<0.01) and Navy hospitals (β02 = 0.17, 
p<0.01) have about 20% higher number of laparoscopic cholecystectomies than Army hospitals.  
Overseas hospitals (β05 = 0.29, p<0.001) also have 34% higher number of laparoscopic 
cholecystectomy than major teaching hospitals in the United States. 
 The only other service difference was found in primary cesarean section deliveries (IQI 
33).  Navy hospitals (β02 = 0.19, p<0.01) had 21% more primary cesarean section deliveries than 
Army hospitals. This was the only significant variable for IQI 33.   
 Patient safety indicators.   
The results of the mixed effects Poisson regression for patient safety indicators are 
displayed in Table 16.  Similar to IQIs, the regression coefficients, standard errors and 
exponentiated regression coefficients for each PSI are presented.  There are also some patient 
safety indicators that have unusually large estimates for the variables OS and NON.  They will 
be explained after discussion of the significant estimates for PSIs.   
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Table 16       
Multilevel Mixed Effects Models for Quality: Patient Safety Indicators 
  
Note. 
a 
Likelihood Ratio Test compares current mixed effects model with standard Poisson regression with no random effects. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
         
exp(coeff.) exp(coeff.) exp(coeff.) exp(coeff.) exp(coeff.)
TIME (β10) 0.07 (0.13) 1.07 0.04 (0.04) 1.04 0.06 (0.04) 1.06 -0.21 (0.11) 0.81 0.01 (0.04) 1.01
WOUND (β20) 0.03 (0.09) 1.03 -0.03 (0.03) 0.97 -0.01 (0.03) 0.99 0.04 (0.08) 1.04 0.00 (0.02) 1.00
RN (β30) -0.09 (0.12) 0.92 -0.04 (0.04) 0.96 -0.06 (0.04) 0.94 -0.18* (0.08) 0.84 0.05 (0.03) 1.05
CLIN (β40) 0.09 (0.07) 1.10 0.01 (0.03) 1.01 0.00 (0.03) 1.00 0.03 (0.04) 1.03 -0.03 (0.02) 0.97
DEPLOY (β50) -0.01 (0.02) 0.99 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 0.00 (0.01) 1.00 -0.01 (0.02) 0.99 0.00 (0.00) 1.00
CONTRACT (β60) -0.02 (0.18) 0.99 -0.08 (0.07) 0.93 -0.11 (0.07) 0.90 0.20* (0.1) 1.22 -0.05 (0.05) 0.96
CMI (β70) -0.45 (1.11) 0.64 0.15 (0.37) 1.17 0.92*(0.4) 2.51 0.58 (0.46) 1.79 0.08 (0.36) 1.08
AF (β01) -0.85 (0.79) 0.43 -0.36 (0.29) 0.70 0.35 (0.25) 1.42 -0.51 (0.41) 0.60 -0.06 (0.24) 0.94
NAVY (β02) -0.49 (0.73) 0.61 -0.17 (0.28) 0.84 0.20 (0.25) 1.22 0.30 (0.36) 1.34 -0.2 (0.24) 0.82
MINOR (β03) -0.69 (0.81) 0.50 -0.11 (0.28) 0.89 -0.53 (0.27) 0.59 0.41 (0.36) 1.50 0.04 (0.29) 1.04
NON (β04) -2.23*(1.08) 0.11 -0.87*(0.38) 0.42 -0.55 (0.36) 0.58 0.84 (0.5) 2.31 -0.36 (0.33) 0.70
OS (β05) -2.13 (1.17) 0.12 -0.39 (0.41) 0.68 -1.64***(0.46) 0.19 0.37 (0.72) 1.44 -1.25**(0.38) 0.29
AF x TIME (β11) -0.13 (0.19) 0.88 0.06 (0.06) 1.06 -0.07 (0.05) 0.93 0.28*(0.14) 1.32 0.05 (0.05) 1.05
NAVY x TIME (β12) -0.14 (0.18) 0.87 0.00 (0.06) 1.00 -0.01 (0.05) 0.99 0.17 (0.13) 1.19 0.00 (0.05) 1.00
MINOR x TIME (β13) 0.09 (0.16) 1.09 0.04 (0.04) 1.04 0.02 (0.05) 1.02 0.00 (0.12) 1.00 -0.04 (0.05) 0.96
NON x TIME (β14) 0.41 (0.22) 1.51 0.04 (0.08) 1.04 -0.08 (0.08) 0.92 -0.01 (0.16) 0.99 -0.01 (0.06) 0.99
OS x TIME (β15) 0.36 (0.26) 1.43 0.01 (0.1) 1.01 0.13 (0.11) 1.14 0.05 (0.25) 1.05 0.16*(0.07) 1.17
Constant (β00) -0.09 (1.38) 0.91 0.1 (0.49) 1.11 -0.75 (0.51) 0.47 0.65 (0.63) 1.91 0.38 (0.46) 1.46
Random Effects Parameters
Variance Std. Err. Variance Std. Err. Variance Std. Err. Variance Std. Err. Variance Std. Err.
Slope (τ11 ) 0.027 0.027 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.003 <0.001 <0.001 0.012 0.004
Intercept (τ00) 1.412 0.659 0.364 0.136 0.174 0.105 <0.001 <0.000 0.375 0.115
Covariance (τ01) -0.130 0.121 -0.043 0.022 -0.003 0.015 <-0.001 <0.001 -0.035 0.019
Likelihood Ratio Test
a
Observations (n)
Hospitals (J)
PSI 14 PSI 15
407 362 405 372 407
Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE)
PSI 1 PSI 3
Complications of 
Anesthesia
Decubitus Ulcer
PSI 12
Postop PE or DVT
χ
2
(3) = 379.41***
Postop Wound 
Dehiscence
Accidental Puncture or 
Laceration
Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE)
7070 64 70 66
χ
2
(3) = 53.70*** χ
2
(3) = 160.74*** χ
2
(3) = 19.21*** χ
2
(3) = 0
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For both complications of anesthesia (PSI 1) and decubitus ulcer (PSI 3), only the 
coefficient for non-teaching hospital was significant.  The estimates imply that non-teaching 
hospitals (PSI 1: β04 = -2.23, p<0.05; PSI 3: β04 = -0.87, p<0.05) have 89% fewer complications 
of anesthesia and 58% fewer instances of decubitus ulcer than major teaching hospitals.  When 
compared to medical centers in the United States, the estimates imply that overseas hospitals  
(β05 = -1.64, p<0.001) had 81% fewer cases of postoperative pulmonary embolism or deep vein 
thrombosis (DVT) (PSI 12).   
 RN staffing (β30 = -0.18, p<0.05) was only associated with postoperative wound 
dehiscence (PSI 14).  An increase in RN staffing by one unit (1 FTE/1000 bed days) was 
associated with a 16% decrease in postoperative wound dehiscence incidents.  Conversely, an 
increase in contract staffing (β60 = 0.20, p<0.05) by one unit (1 FTE/1000 bed days) was 
associated with a 22% increase in postoperative wound dehiscence incidents.  Finally, the time 
trend for Air Force hospitals (β11 = 0.28, p<0.05) is significantly different from that for Army 
hospitals.  Estimates imply that postoperative wound dehiscence incidents for Army hospitals 
decrease 18.8% per year while incidents for overseas hospitals increase 8% per year. 
 Again, the estimates for overseas hospitals are extreme for accidental puncture or 
laceration (PSI 15:  β05 = -1.25, p<0.01).  The estimates imply that overseas hospitals have 71% 
fewer adverse events than major teaching hospitals for PSI 15. Overseas hospitals also had a 
significantly different rate of change (slope) than major teaching hospitals for accidental 
puncture (β15 = 0.16, p<0.05).  Adverse events for major teaching hospitals only increase 1% per 
year while adverse events for overseas hospitals increase 19% per year. 
 For the time varying staffing variables, an increase in RN staffing [PSI 14: exp (β30) = 
.84] and clinician staffing [IQI 20: exp (β40) = .92] was associated with a decrease in adverse 
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events, postoperative wound dehiscence (PSI 14) and pneumonia mortality (IQI 20), 
respectively.  However, an increase in contract staffing was associated with increased adverse 
events in laparoscopic cholecystectomy [IQI 23: exp (β60) = 1.05] and postoperative wound 
dehiscence [PSI 14: exp (β60) = 1.22].   
For some of the quality indicators, especially patient safety indicators, there are unusually 
large (in absolute value) estimates for overseas hospitals (OS) and non-teaching hospitals 
(NON).  One of the main reasons for the large estimates is due to the very small number of 
observed and expected incidents for overseas and non-teaching military hospitals.  For example, 
for IQI 20 (pneumonia mortality), the total number of observed and expected incidents per year 
for all overseas hospitals is very small (ranging from 1 to 5 observed incidents and 2.2 to 2.7 
expected incidents).  In contrast, major teaching hospitals have much higher total numbers 
(ranging from 55 to 90 observed incidents and 74.3 to 93.3 expected incidents).  For PSI 1 
(complications of anesthesia) and PSI 14 (postoperative wound dehiscence), the same pattern of 
very small observed and expected total incidents per year are evident when looking at the total 
sum by group.  For PSI 1, non-teaching hospitals (observed range: 0-5 incidents; expected range: 
5.7-6.8 incidents) along with overseas hospitals show the same pattern of low adverse event 
incidence. 
In other instances, such as PSI 12 (postoperative pulmonary embolism or DVT) and PSI 
15 (accidental puncture or laceration), a few hospitals with high number of events mask the true 
pattern of low observed and expected incidences of the majority of the hospitals.  Figure 6 and 
Figure 7 graph the observed and expected adverse events by hospital over time for PSI 12 and 
PSI 14, respectively.  Initially, the total number of observed and expected incidences seem to be 
moderate in size, but if Hospitals 53, 55, 60 and 61 are excluded in Figure 6, the rest of the  
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Figure 6.  PSI 12 Observed and Expected Numbers by Hospital per Year 
 
 
Figure 7.  PSI 15 Observed and Expected Numbers by Hospital per Year 
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hospitals follow the same pattern of low observed and expected number of postoperative 
pulmonary embolism or DVT (PSI 12).  The same low numbers are evident in Figure 7 when 
Hospitals 53, 55, and 61 are excluded for accidental puncture or laceration (PSI 15).  
The pattern of unusual differences in parameter estimates suggests that non-teaching and 
overseas hospitals may be different than major teaching hospitals.  There may be coding or 
procedural differences or there may be genuine differences between these types of hospitals,  
or both.  One explanation may be that major teaching hospitals are where most of the clinical 
specialists are located, so they tend to treat more complex patients and have higher acuity 
surgical case loads.  Non-teaching hospitals would send these complex cases to the major 
teaching hospitals in the MHS or to the civilian network.  The more complex surgical cases 
would result in longer length of stay and potentially greater number of in-hospital interventions. 
Both of these possibilities may contribute to a greater opportunity for adverse events.  Another 
explanation may be that the patient population served by major teaching hospitals is older and 
closer to the patient population of civilian hospitals versus the patient population at overseas 
hospitals, which would most likely be composed of active duty service members and their 
spouses and children.  Overseas hospitals would likely not have many seniors over 65 years in 
the patient mix.  Older patients may be more susceptible to having these adverse events or be 
admitted with preexisting conditions.  In addition, the results also suggest that classifying 
overseas hospitals as a separate subset of non-teaching hospitals may not have been necessary.   
Sensitivity Analyses 
 Two sensitivity analyses were conducted.  The first sensitivity check was conducted after 
deleting the control variable overseas (OS) which was used to identify military hospitals in 
foreign countries.  Some of the estimates for non-teaching and overseas hospitals (PSI 1, PSI 12, 
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PSI 15 from Table 16) were much larger in absolute value than reasonably expected, and there 
were relatively few overseas hospital observations for some of the inpatient quality indicators 
(IQI 23 and IQI 33 from Table 8).  Since all overseas hospitals were non-teaching hospitals, the 
type of hospital was identified by three dummy variables (MINOR, NON, OS) to delineate 
teaching status and overseas status combined.  By deleting the variable OS, type of hospital 
simply represents teaching status, and teaching status is identified by two dummy variables 
(MINOR and NON).  Multilevel mixed effects models were conducted after classifying overseas 
hospitals as non-teaching hospitals.  The second sensitivity analysis used fixed effects models 
instead of mixed effects models to constrain slopes and intercepts by groups created by the 
structural variables.  The extreme values for some of the mixed effects model coefficients, along 
with evidence from the likelihood ratio test indicating that adding random slope and intercept for 
IQI 20, IQI 23 and PSI 14 did not significantly improve the model, was the rationale for the fixed 
effects model methodology.  In the fixed effect model, all time invariant variables (e.g., service 
and teaching status) are subsumed in the fixed effect; therefore, parameters for these variables 
cannot be estimated.   
Productivity sensitivity analyses. 
 Classification of overseas hospitals as non-teaching hospital.   
The results comparing all three productivity models (original multilevel mixed effects 
model, multilevel mixed effects model without the variable OS, and fixed effects model) are 
presented in Table 17.  The results for productivity after classifying overseas hospitals as non-
teaching hospitals are very similar to the results from the model including the variable OS.  The 
percent of wounded discharges (β20 = 6.042, p<0.001), clinician staffing (β40 = 4.253, p<0.001) 
and the interaction NAVY*TIME (β12 = -4.974, p<0.05) were again statistically significant as in  
 84 
Table 17 
   Sensitivity Analysis for Productivity 
 
    
  
Mixed Effects 
Model 
Mixed Effects 
Model without OS 
Fixed Effects Model
a 
  Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) 
INTERCEPT (β00)  237.71 (14.34) 238.94 (14.44) 220.29 (6.64) 
TIME (β10)  1.46 (2.62) 2.52 (2.10) 0.64 (2.00) 
WOUND (β20)  5.98*** (1.76) 6.04*** (1.75) 6.99*** (1.44) 
RN (β30)  1.70 (1.18) 1.45 (1.18) 1.56 (1.16) 
CLIN (β40)  4.14*** (0.82) 4.25*** (0.82) 3.00*** (0.84) 
DEPLOY (β50)  -0.16 (0.17) -0.15 (0.17) 0.01 (0.17) 
CONTRACT (β60)  -3.56 (2.27) -3.22 (2.25) -2.75 (2.49) 
AF (β01)  1.73 (12.73) -1.10 (12.75) --- 
NAVY (β02)  -8.22 (12.07) -12.64 (11.88) --- 
MINOR (β03)  -12.25 (16.73) -11.17 (16.91) --- 
NON (β04)  -26.43 (15.47) -33.55* (14.78) --- 
OS (β05)  -46.94** (16.62) --- --- 
AF x TIME (β11)  1.14 (2.47) 1.45 (2.43) 2.56 (1.87) 
NAVY x TIME (β12)  -5.34* (2.33) -4.97* (2.31) -4.89** (1.74) 
MINOR x TIME (β13)  5.24 (2.74) 4.07 (2.21) 5.06* (2.08) 
NON x TIME (β14)  3.43 (2.76) 2.35 (2.13) 2.66 (2.02) 
OS x TIME (β15)  2.23 (2.92) --- 2.55 (2.12) 
    Random Effects 
Parameters 
Variance (SE) Variance (SE) 
  
Slope (τ11 ) 33.57 (10.81) 33.58 (10.72) --- 
Intercept (τ00) 1463.67 (309.27) 1503.17 (313.72) --- 
Covariance (τ01) 28.41 (41.22) 26.12 (41.86) --- 
Level 1 Residual (σ2) 364.97 (32.33) 364.48 (32.23) --- 
    
Likelihood Ratio Test
b χ2(3) = 380.62*** χ2(3) = 384.00*** --- 
F test --- --- F (11, 326) = 11.7*** 
R
2 --- --- 0.232 
Observations (n) 407 407 407 
Hospitals (J) 70 70 70 
Note.  
a 
Level 2 time invariant variables are omitted. 
b 
Likelihood ratio test compares mixed effects model with standard linear regression with 
no random effects. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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the original mixed effects productivity model.  Whereas the coefficient for overseas hospitals 
was significant in the original model, the coefficient for non-teaching hospitals (β04 = 33.553, 
p<0.05) was significant in the model without a separate variable for overseas hospitals.   
Fixed effects models.   
Table 17 also shows the fixed effects model for productivity.  For time varying 
predictors, the same two variables significantly influenced productivity as the mixed effects 
model:  the percentage of wounded discharges (β20 = 6.994, p<0.001) and the number of clinician 
staffing (β40 = 3.003, p<0.001).  All of the time invariant variables representing teaching status, 
overseas hospital, and branch of service were omitted since there was no change in these 
independent variables over time.  For the interactions between TIME and the structural variables, 
the interactions between MINOR and TIME (β13 = 5.058, p<0.05) and between NAVY and 
TIME (β12 = -4.895, p<0.01) were also significant.  The difference in the productivity rate of 
change is evident for Navy hospitals when compared to Army hospitals, similar to the mixed 
effects models.  However, the productivity rate of change for minor teaching hospitals increases 
significantly faster per year than major teaching hospitals in the fixed effects model.     
Quality sensitivity analyses. 
 Classification of overseas hospitals as non-teaching hospital.   
The results comparing all three quality models (original multilevel mixed effects model, 
multilevel mixed effects model without the variable OS, and fixed effects model) for each 
quality indicator are presented in Tables 18-21.  For inpatient quality indicators, classifying all 
overseas hospitals as non-teaching hospitals changed very few of the coefficients (see Tables 18 
and 19).  Like the original multilevel mixed effects model, clinician staffing and the interaction 
of NONxTIME was significantly associated with pneumonia mortality (IQI 20, Table 18).   
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Table 18
Sensitivity Analysis for Quality: Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQI 20 and IQI23)
Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.) Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.) Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.) Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.) Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.) Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.)
TIME (β10) -0.07 (0.05) 0.93 -0.07 (0.05) 0.93 -0.08* (0.04) 0.92 0.02 (0.01) 1.02 0.02 (0.01) 1.02 0.02 (0.01) 1.02
WOUND (β20) -0.07 (0.06) 0.94 -0.06 (0.06) 0.94 -0.05 (0.06) 0.95 0.01 (0.01) 1.01 0.01 (0.01) 1.01 0.01 (0.01) 1.01
RN (β30) 0.10 (0.05) 1.10 0.10 (0.05) 1.10 0.16* (0.06) 1.17 -0.01 (0.01) 0.99 -0.01 (0.01) 0.99 -0.01 (0.01) 0.99
CLIN (β40) -0.08*(0.03) 0.92 -0.08** (0.03) 0.92 0.03 (0.05) 1.03 0.00 (0.01) 1.00 -0.01 (0.01) 0.99 0.00 (0.01) 1.00
DEPLOY (β50) -0.004 (0.01) 1.00 -0.003 (0.01) 1.00 0.00 (0.01) 1.00 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 0.001 (0.002) 1.00 0.00 (0.00) 1.00
CONTRACT (β60) -0.09 (0.08) 0.92 -0.09 (0.08) 0.92 -0.15* (0.07) 1.16 0.05*(0.02) 1.05 0.04* (0.02) 1.04 0.05*(0.02) 1.05
CMI (β70) 0.11 (0.31) 1.11 0.11 (0.3) 1.11 -0.67 (0.99) 0.51 -0.17*(0.08) 0.84 -0.14 (0.08) 0.87 -0.17*(0.08) 0.84
AF (β01) 0.39 (0.22) 1.48 0.41 (0.22) 1.50 --- 0.18**(0.06) 1.20 0.16* (0.06) 1.17 ---
NAVY (β02) -0.03 (0.22) 0.97 -0.08 (0.22) 0.92 --- 0.17**(0.05) 1.19 0.19*** (0.05) 1.21 ---
MINOR (β03) -0.21 (0.2) 0.81 -0.20 (0.2) 0.82 --- 0.08 (0.06) 1.08 0.09 (0.06) 1.10 ---
NON (β04) 0.11 (0.32) 1.12 0.09 (0.25) 1.10 --- 0.09 (0.08) 1.09 0.19** (0.06) 1.21 ---
OS (β05) -0.67 (0.57) 0.51 --- --- 0.29***(0.08) 1.34 --- ---
AF x TIME (β11) -0.11 (0.06) 0.89 -0.11 (0.06) 0.89 -0.14*** (0.04) 0.87 0.00 (0.02) 1.00 0.01 (0.02) 1.01 0.00 (0.02) 1.00
NAVY x TIME (β12) -0.01 (0.07) 0.99 0.01 (0.06) 1.01 -0.01 (0.06) 0.99 0.00 (0.02) 1.00 -0.004 (0.02) 1.00 0.00 (0.02) 1.00
MINOR x TIME (β13) 0.04 (0.05) 1.04 0.04 (0.05) 1.04 0.03 (0.04) 1.03 -0.01 (0.01) 0.99 -0.01 (0.01) 0.99 -0.01 (0.01) 0.99
NON x TIME (β14) -0.22*(0.11) 0.80 -0.21* (0.1) 0.80 -0.24 (0.16) 0.79 -0.01 (0.02) 0.99 -0.03* (0.02) 0.97 -0.01 (0.02) 0.99
OS x TIME (β15) 0.27 (0.15) 1.31 --- 0.35** (0.11) 1.42 -0.03 (0.02) 0.97 --- -0.03 (0.02) 0.97
Constant (β00) 0.14 (0.41) 1.16 0.15 (0.41) 1.16 --- -0.03 (0.11) 0.97 -0.05 (0.11) 0.95 ---
Random Effects Parameters Variance Std. Err. Variance Std. Err. Variance Std. Err. Variance Std. Err.
Slope (τ11 ) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Intercept (τ00) 0.043 0.041 0.043 0.040 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
Covariance (τ01) -0.001 0.007 -0.001 0.007 <0.001 <0.001 <-0.001 <0.001
Likelihood Ratio Test
b
Wald 
Observations (n)
Hospitals (J)
b
Likelihood Ratio Test compares current mixed effects model with standard Poisson regression with no random effects.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Note.   
a 
Level 2 time invariant variables are omitted.
IQI 20 Pneumonia Mortality IQI 23 Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy
Mixed Effects Model 
(without OS)
Fixed Effects Model
a
263 230
---
42
Mixed Effects Model 
(with OS)
47
Mixed Effects Model 
(without OS)
χ2(3) = 7.22
230
Mixed Effects Model 
(with OS)
263
χ2(3) = 7.01
 χ2(12) = 228.86***
χ2(3) = 0--- ---
 χ2(12) = 61.21***
χ2(3) = 0
------ ---
47 4235
230206
Fixed Effects Model
a
42
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Table 19 
Sensitivity Analysis for Quality: Inpatient Quality Indicator (IQI 33) and Patient Safety Indicator (PSI 1)
Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.) Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.) Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.) Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.) Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.) Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.)
TIME (β10) 0.03 (0.02) 1.03 0.03* (0.01) 1.03 0.03 (0.02) 1.03 0.07 (0.13) 1.07 0.12 (0.13) 1.13 0.21 (0.15) 1.23
WOUND (β20) -0.01 (0.01) 0.99 -0.01 (0.01) 0.99 -0.01 (0.01) 0.99 0.03 (0.09) 1.03 0.07 (0.1) 1.07 -0.17 (0.12) 0.85
RN (β30) 0.00 (0.01) 1.00 0.003 (0.01) 1.00 0.00 (0.01) 1.00 -0.09 (0.12) 0.92 -0.06 (0.13) 0.94 -0.08 (0.15) 0.92
CLIN (β40) 0.01 (0.01) 1.01 0.01 (0.01) 1.01 0.01 (0.01) 1.01 0.09 (0.07) 1.10 0.07 (0.07) 1.07 0.10 (0.10) 1.11
DEPLOY (β50) 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 0.001 (0.001) 1.00 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 -0.01 (0.02) 0.99 -0.01 (0.02) 0.99 0.00 (0.02) 1.00
CONTRACT (β60) 0.01 (0.01) 1.01 0.01 (0.01) 1.01 0.01 (0.01) 1.01 -0.02 (0.18) 0.99 -0.07 (0.18) 0.93 -0.03 (0.21) 0.97
CMI (β70) 0.20 (0.14) 1.22 0.2 (0.14) 1.22 0.20 (0.14) 1.22 -0.45 (1.11) 0.64 -0.22 (1.13) 0.81 5.90*(2.99) 365.04
AF (β01) 0.01 (0.07) 1.01 0.004 (0.07) 1.00 --- -0.85 (0.79) 0.43 -0.79 (0.75) 0.45 ---
NAVY (β02) 0.19**(0.07) 1.21 0.19** (0.07) 1.20 --- -0.49 (0.73) 0.61 -0.33 (0.67) 0.72 ---
MINOR (β03) 0.02 (0.09) 1.02 0.02 (0.08) 1.02 --- -0.69 (0.81) 0.50 -0.41 (0.77) 0.66 ---
NON (β04) 0.11 (0.1) 1.12 0.09 (0.09) 1.10 --- -2.23*(1.08) 0.11 -1.48 (0.82) 0.23 ---
OS (β05) 0.07 (0.1) 1.07 --- --- -2.13 (1.17) 0.12 --- ---
AF x TIME (β11) 0.01 (0.02) 1.02 0.02 (0.02) 1.02 0.01 (0.02) 1.02 -0.13 (0.19) 0.88 -0.13 (0.19) 0.87 -0.36*(0.15) 0.70
NAVY x TIME (β12) -0.02 (0.02) 0.98 -0.02 (0.02) 0.98 -0.02 (0.02) 0.98 -0.14 (0.18) 0.87 -0.17 (0.18) 0.84 -0.29 (0.17) 0.75
MINOR x TIME (β13) 0.0 (0.02) 1.00 0.001 (0.02) 1.00 0.00 (0.02) 1.00 0.09 (0.16) 1.09 0.01 (0.15) 1.01 -0.17 (0.16) 0.84
NON x TIME (β14) -0.01 (0.02) 0.99 -0.01 (0.01) 0.99 -0.01 (0.02) 0.99 0.41 (0.22) 1.51 0.24 (0.16) 1.28 0.21 (0.23) 1.24
OS x TIME (β15) 0.01 (0.02) 1.01 --- 0.01 (0.02) 1.01 0.36 (0.26) 1.43 --- 0.22 (0.33) 1.25
Constant (β00) -0.53 (0.17) 0.59 -0.52 (0.16) 0.59 --- -0.09 (1.38) 0.91 -0.47 (1.39) 0.62 ---
Random Effects Parameters Variance Std. Err. Variance Std. Err. Variance Std. Err. Variance Std. Err.
Slope (τ11 ) 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.027 0.027 0.029 0.029
Intercept (τ00) 0.031 0.008 0.032 0.008 1.412 0.659 1.250 0.570
Covariance (τ01) -0.004 0.002 -0.005 0.002 -0.130 0.121 -0.093 0.109
Likelihood Ratio Test
b
Wald 
Observations (n) 407
Hospitals (J) 70
b
Likelihood Ratio Test compares current mixed effects model with standard Poisson regression with no random effects.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Note.   
a 
Level 2 time invariant variables are omitted.
IQI 33 Primary Cesarean Delivery
Mixed Effects Model 
(without OS)
5959 59
346
χ2(3) = 478***
---
346
---
346
Mixed Effects Model 
(with OS)
 χ2(12) = 105.46***
χ2(3) = 479***
PSI 1 Complications of Anesthesia
 χ2(12) = 88.52***
185
Fixed Effects Model
a
31
χ2(3) = 53.73*** ---
Fixed Effects Model
a
---
χ2(3) = 53.70***
407
70
Mixed Effects Model 
(with OS)
Mixed Effects Model 
(without OS)
--- ---
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Table 20
Sensitivity Analysis for Quality: Patient Safety Indicators (PSI 3 and PSI 12)
Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.) Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.) Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.) Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.) Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.) Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.)
TIME (β10) 0.04 (0.04) 1.04 0.05 (0.04) 1.05 0.01 (0.05) 1.01 0.06 (0.04) 1.06 0.06 (0.04) 1.06 0.05 (0.04) 1.05
WOUND (β20) -0.03 (0.03) 0.97 -0.03 (0.03) 0.97 -0.07**(0.02) 0.93 -0.01 (0.03) 0.99 -0.01 (0.03) 0.99 -0.03 (0.04) 0.97
RN (β30) -0.04 (0.04) 0.96 -0.03 (0.04) 0.97 0.01 (0.06) 1.01 -0.06 (0.04) 0.94 -0.07 (0.04) 0.93 -0.01 (0.04) 0.99
CLIN (β40) 0.01 (0.03) 1.01 -0.004 (0.03) 1.00 -0.06 (0.03) 0.94 0.00 (0.03) 1.00 0.01 (0.03) 1.01 0.04 (0.03) 1.04
DEPLOY (β50) 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 -0.005 (0.004) 1.00 -0.01 (0.00) 0.99 0.00 (0.01) 1.00 0.003 (0.01) 1.00 0.00 (0.00) 1.00
CONTRACT (β60) -0.08 (0.07) 0.93 -0.09 (0.07) 0.92 0.10 (0.13) 1.11 -0.11 (0.07) 0.90 -0.09 (0.07) 0.92 -0.11 (0.07) 0.90
CMI (β70) 0.15 (0.37) 1.17 0.20 (0.38) 1.22 -0.06 (0.84) 0.94 0.92*(0.4) 2.51 0.82 (0.42) 2.27 -0.45 (0.67) 0.64
AF (β01) -0.36 (0.29) 0.70 -0.38 (0.29) 0.69 --- 0.35 (0.25) 1.42 0.41 (0.27) 1.51 ---
NAVY (β02) -0.17 (0.28) 0.84 -0.09 (0.28) 0.91 --- 0.20 (0.25) 1.22 0.13 (0.27) 1.13 ---
MINOR (β03) -0.11 (0.28) 0.89 -0.05 (0.28) 0.95 --- -0.53 (0.27) 0.59 -0.60* (0.3) 0.55 ---
NON (β04) -0.87*(0.38) 0.42 -0.54 (0.3) 0.58 --- -0.55 (0.36) 0.58 -0.99** (0.32) 0.37 ---
OS (β05) -0.39 (0.41) 0.68 --- --- -1.64***(0.46) 0.19 --- ---
AF x TIME (β11) 0.06 (0.06) 1.06 0.06 (0.06) 1.07 0.07 (0.05) 1.08 -0.07 (0.05) 0.93 -0.09 (0.05) 0.91 -0.09 (0.05) 0.92
NAVY x TIME (β12) 0.00 (0.06) 1.00 -0.005 (0.06) 1.00 0.02 (0.05) 1.02 -0.01 (0.05) 0.99 -0.01 (0.05) 0.99 0.00 (0.05) 1.00
MINOR x TIME (β13) 0.04 (0.04) 1.04 0.03 (0.04) 1.03 0.03 (0.04) 1.03 0.02 (0.05) 1.02 0.03 (0.05) 1.03 0.03 (0.05) 1.03
NON x TIME (β14) 0.04 (0.08) 1.04 -0.03 (0.06) 0.97 0.01 (0.07) 1.01 -0.08 (0.08) 0.92 0.003 (0.07) 1.00 -0.08 (0.08) 0.92
OS x TIME (β15) 0.01 (0.1) 1.01 --- 0.06 (0.09) 1.06 0.13 (0.11) 1.14 --- 0.20*(0.10) 1.22
Constant (β00) 0.1 (0.49) 1.11 0.02 (0.5) 1.02 --- -0.75 (0.51) 0.47 -0.69 (0.54) 0.50 ---
Random Effects Parameters Variance Std. Err. Variance Std. Err. Variance Std. Err. Variance Std. Err.
Slope (τ11 ) 0.008 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003
Intercept (τ00) 0.364 0.136 0.372 0.137 0.174 0.105 0.256 0.132
Covariance (τ01) -0.043 0.022 -0.042 0.022 -0.003 0.015 -0.012 0.020
Likelihood Ratio Test
b
Wald 
Observations (n)
Hospitals (J)
b
Likelihood Ratio Test compares current mixed effects model with standard Poisson regression with no random effects.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Note.   
a 
Level 2 time invariant variables are omitted.
362
64
χ2(3) = 160.74***
Mixed Effects Model 
(with OS)
Mixed Effects Model 
(without OS)
Fixed Effects Model
a
χ2(3) = 163.61***
64
PSI 3 Decubitus Ulcer
--- ---
70
405
---
70
405
PSI 12 Postoperative PE or DVT
---
Mixed Effects Model 
(with OS)
Mixed Effects Model 
(without OS)
Fixed Effects Model
a
 χ2(12) = 56.14***
290
49
--- χ2(3) = 19.21***
362
 χ2(12) = 51.63***
291
50
---χ2(3) = 31.29***
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Table 21
Sensitivity Analysis for Quality: Patient Safety Indicators (PSI 14 and PSI 15)
Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.) Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.) Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.) Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.) Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.) Coeff. (SE) exp(coeff.)
TIME (β10) -0.21 (0.11) 0.81 -0.22 (0.11) 0.81 -0.16 (0.16) 0.85 0.01 (0.04) 1.01 0.03 (0.04) 1.03 0.03 (0.03) 1.03
WOUND (β20) 0.04 (0.08) 1.04 0.04 (0.07) 1.04 -0.01 (0.09) 0.99 0.00 (0.02) 1.00 0.01 (0.02) 1.01 -0.04 (0.03) 0.96
RN (β30) -0.18* (0.08) 0.84 -0.18* (0.08) 0.83 -0.27 (0.19) 0.77 0.05 (0.03) 1.05 0.04 (0.03) 1.04 0.04 (0.05) 1.04
CLIN (β40) 0.03 (0.04) 1.03 0.03 (0.04) 1.03 0.09 (0.13) 1.10 -0.03 (0.02) 0.97 -0.02 (0.02) 0.98 0.00 (0.02) 1.00
DEPLOY (β50) -0.01 (0.02) 0.99 -0.01 (0.02) 0.99 -0.01 (0.02) 0.99 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 0.001 (0) 1.00 0.00 (0.00) 1.00
CONTRACT (β60) 0.20* (0.1) 1.22 0.21* (0.1) 1.23 0.18 (0.18) 1.19 -0.05 (0.05) 0.96 -0.04 (0.05) 0.96 0.03 (0.08) 1.03
CMI (β70) 0.58 (0.46) 1.79 0.56 (0.46) 1.74 -0.03 (2.77) 0.97 0.08 (0.36) 1.08 0.08 (0.36) 1.09 0.20 (0.78) 1.22
AF (β01) -0.51 (0.41) 0.60 -0.49 (0.41) 0.61 --- -0.06 (0.24) 0.94 -0.09 (0.25) 0.92 ---
NAVY (β02) 0.30 (0.36) 1.34 0.27 (0.36) 1.31 --- -0.2 (0.24) 0.82 -0.32 (0.24) 0.72 ---
MINOR (β03) 0.41 (0.36) 1.50 0.37 (0.35) 1.45 --- 0.04 (0.29) 1.04 0.09 (0.3) 1.09 ---
NON (β04) 0.84 (0.5) 2.31 0.64 (0.4) 1.89 --- -0.36 (0.33) 0.70 -0.56 (0.3) 0.57 ---
OS (β05) 0.37 (0.72) 1.44 --- --- -1.25**(0.38) 0.29 --- ---
AF x TIME (β11) 0.28*(0.14) 1.32 0.27 (0.14) 1.32 0.31*(0.13) 1.32 0.05 (0.05) 1.05 0.04 (0.06) 1.04 0.03 (0.04) 1.03
NAVY x TIME (β12) 0.17 (0.13) 1.19 0.18 (0.13) 1.20 0.11 (0.18) 1.11 0.00 (0.05) 1.00 0.02 (0.06) 1.02 -0.03 (0.06) 0.97
MINOR x TIME (β13) 0.00 (0.12) 1.00 0.01 (0.12) 1.01 -0.06 (0.14) 0.94 -0.04 (0.05) 0.96 -0.05 (0.04) 0.95 -0.04 (0.04) 0.96
NON x TIME (β14) -0.01 (0.16) 0.99 0.05 (0.13) 1.05 0.04 (0.15) 1.04 -0.01 (0.06) 0.99 0.01 (0.05) 1.01 0.00 (0.04) 1.00
OS x TIME (β15) 0.05 (0.25) 1.05 --- 0.13 (0.33) 1.14 0.16*(0.07) 1.17 --- 0.26*(0.11) 1.30
Constant (β00) 0.65 (0.63) 1.91 0.67 (0.63) 1.95 --- 0.38 (0.46) 1.46 0.34 (0.46) 1.41 ---
Random Effects Parameters Variance Std. Err. Variance Std. Err. Variance Std. Err. Variance Std. Err.
Slope (τ11 ) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.017 0.012 0.004 0.016 0.005
Intercept (τ00) <0.001 <0.000 0.003 0.208 0.375 0.115 0.427 0.128
Covariance (τ01) <-0.001 <0.001 <-0.001 0.059 -0.035 0.019 -0.048 0.023
Likelihood Ratio Test
b
Wald 
Observations (n)
Hospitals (J)
b
Likelihood Ratio Test compares current mixed effects model with standard Poisson regression with no random effects.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Note.   
a 
Level 2 time invariant variables are omitted.
 χ2(12) = 46.9***
362
PSI 15 Accidental Puncture or Laceration
6266
χ2(3) = 398.27***
70
 χ2(12) = 15.36***
213
36
---
Mixed Effects Model 
(without OS)
66 70
372 407
χ2(3) = 0
372
--- χ2(3) = 379.41***
407
--- --- ---
χ2(3) = 0
Mixed Effects Model 
(with OS)
Mixed Effects Model 
(without OS)
Fixed Effects Model
a
Mixed Effects Model 
(with OS)
---
PSI 14 Postoperative Wound Dehiscence
Fixed Effects Model
a
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There were a few differences for laparoscopic cholecystectomy (IQI 23, Table 18).  Non-
teaching hospitals (instead of overseas hospitals) significantly differ from major teaching 
hospitals in the number of adverse events, and the rate of change each year for non-teaching 
hospitals is slower than major teaching hospitals.  For primary cesarean delivery (IQI 33, Table 
19), the overall linear rate of change (TIME: β10 = 0.03, p<0.05) became statistically significant 
when overseas hospitals were combined into one group with non-teaching hospitals.  For each 
additional year, the number of primary cesarean deliveries increases by 3% for Army major 
teaching hospitals.  
 For patient safety indicators overall, the unusually large (in absolute value) estimates 
decreased when comparing major teaching hospitals to non-teaching hospitals or overseas 
hospitals once all overseas hospitals were classified as non-teaching hospitals.  The coefficients 
for non-teaching hospitals for complications of anesthesia (PSI 1, Table 19) and decubitus ulcer 
(PSI 3, Table 20) along with the coefficient for overseas hospitals for accidental puncture or 
laceration (PSI 15, Table 21) are not as extreme and are no longer statistically significant.  Only 
postoperative pulmonary embolism or DVT (PSI 12, Table 20) resulted in a statistically 
significant difference between non-teaching hospitals (instead of overseas hospitals) and major 
teaching hospitals. Non-teaching hospitals (β04 = -0.99, p<0.01) had 63% fewer cases of 
postoperative pulmonary embolism or DVT than major teaching hospitals whereas overseas 
hospitals (β05 = -1.64, p<0.001) had 81% fewer cases of postoperative pulmonary embolism or 
DVT. 
 Fixed effects models.   
The results of the fixed effects models for the quality dependent variables are shown in 
Tables 18 and 19 for inpatient quality indicators and Tables 19 - 21 for patient safety indicators.  
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For the inpatient quality indicators, the greatest difference between the original mixed effects 
model (including the variable OS) and the fixed effects model is for the dependent variable, 
pneumonia mortality (IQI 20, Table 18).   Three of the time varying predictors (TIME, RN 
staffing and contract staffing) were statistically significant at α = 0.05 while clinician staffing is 
no longer statistically significant.  The rate of change for Air Force hospitals and overseas 
hospitals became significant while the rate of change for non-teaching hospitals is no longer 
significant.  Since the likelihood ratio test (χ2(3) = 7.01, p > 0.05) from Table 15 showed that 
allowing the slopes and intercepts for each hospital to randomly vary over time (random 
intercepts and slopes) did not significantly improve the model, the results of the fixed effects 
model is most likely a better model for pneumonia mortality.  The fixed effects coefficients 
estimated for laparoscopic cholecystectomy (IQI 23, Table 18) and primary cesarean delivery 
(IQI 33, Table 19) are essentially the same as those estimated in the mixed effects models. 
 For patient safety indicators, the number of observations and the number of hospitals in 
the fixed effects models are drastically different from the mixed effects models, especially for 
complications of anesthesia (PSI 1, Table 19) and accidental puncture or laceration (PSI 14, 
Table 21).  If there were no observed adverse events for the dependent variable in all years, the 
hospital was excluded from the fixed effects model.  Not surprisingly, many hospitals had zero 
observed adverse events even though the expected adverse events were greater than zero.  
Without variation in the dependent variable, these hospitals were dropped during the statistical 
analysis for the fixed effects models.  The dependent variable complications of anesthesia (PSI 1, 
Table 19) had the biggest difference in observations and hospitals affected.  The sample size 
decreased from 407 to 185, and the number of hospitals dropped from 70 to 31 in the fixed 
effects model.  All of the coefficients are different, even changing the direction of the 
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relationship between the predictor and the dependent variable (e.g., WOUND).  The mixed 
effects model may be a better model to use if it is reasonable to assume that none of regressors is 
correlated with the hospital structural variables (fixed effect).  Although the mixed effects model 
includes all the hospitals in the sample and the addition of the random slopes and intercepts 
significantly improved the model when compared to a model without any random effects 
according to the likelihood ratio test (χ2(3) = 53.70,  p < .001), it may not be reasonable to 
assume that the regressors are uncorrelated with the fixed effect. 
 For all five PSIs, only one time varying predictor (WOUND: PSI 3, Table 20) was 
statistically significant.  The coefficients for RN staffing and contract staffing for postoperative 
wound dehiscence (PSI 14, Table 21) are no longer statistically significant in the fixed effects 
models.  For PSI 14, the likelihood ratio test (χ2(3) = 0, p > .05) showed that allowing the slopes 
and intercepts for each hospital to randomly vary over time did not significantly improve the 
model; therefore, the fixed effects model may be a better model, but the number of observations 
decrease to 213 with only 36 hospitals out of 66 providing data for the fixed effects model.  
When sample sizes more closely correspond, the fixed effects models generally yield similar 
results as the mixed effects models. 
Summary of Results 
 In summary, the structure of the hospital, whether it is an overseas hospital, hospital 
teaching status, or branch of armed service of the hospital, influenced productivity and certain 
quality indicators.  The structural components were not able to reliably predict differences in 
productivity and all quality indicators.  The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, denoted by the 
variables for wounded discharges and deployed staff, were not significantly related to any of the 
quality indicators, and only the percentage of wounded discharges were significantly related to 
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the productivity of military hospitals.  In essence, the war related jolt increased the workload and 
productivity of military hospitals, but it did not affect the quality provided in the hospitals, as 
measured by AHRQ inpatient and patient safety quality indicators.  In the following chapter, 
these results are explored within the theoretical framework and study hypotheses.  In addition, 
conclusions and implications are discussed. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
 
 
 
The purpose of this research was to determine what impact the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have had on the productivity and quality of United States military hospitals over the 
fiscal years 2001-2006.  To determine how productivity and quality changed over the years, and 
to try to discern whether the trends differ by type of military hospital are the research questions 
addressed.  Drawing on contingency theory, the jolt-related uncertainty arising from the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, and its influence on productivity and quality of military hospitals were 
examined within the context of the structural characteristics of the hospitals.  In this chapter, the 
findings of the tested hypotheses are discussed in relation to the impact on productivity and 
quality of military hospitals (see Table 22).  Table 22 identifies which hypotheses were 
supported by the multilevel mixed effects models for productivity and quality.  Study limitations, 
policy implications, and directions for future study are also addressed.  
Productivity 
Structural characteristics of hospitals, such as teaching status, were hypothesized to 
influence the level of productivity at military hospitals.  The complexities of running graduate 
education programs and providing tertiary care are related to inertia in major teaching hospitals 
that makes change and adaptation to a new environment slower.  Therefore, as stated in 
Hypothesis 3, major military teaching hospitals’ rate of change in productivity would be slower 
than minor and non-teaching hospitals’ rate of change in productivity. Hypothesis 3 is not   
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Table 22 
Summary of Hypotheses Tested Categorized by Dependent Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
(Construct) 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 
Supported? 
Productivity       
 Teaching Status 
(Structure) 
Hypothesis 3: Major teaching hospitals’ rate of 
change in productivity will be slower than minor 
and non-teaching hospitals’ rate of change in 
productivity.  
Not supported          
(Table 14, β13, β14) 
 Branch of Service 
(Structure) 
Hypothesis 5: Army hospitals’ rate of change in 
productivity will be less rapid than Air Force and 
Navy hospitals’ rate of change in productivity. 
Not supported         
(Table 14,  β11, β12) 
 Uncertainty 
(Deployed Staff) 
Hypothesis 7:  There will be an inverse relationship 
between proportion of deployed FTEs and 
productivity. 
Not supported          
(Table 14, β50) 
Quality       
     IQI Teaching Status 
(Structure) 
Hypothesis 1:  The average level of quality across 
the six years will be higher for major teaching 
hospitals than minor and non-teaching hospitals. 
 Not supported   
(Table 15, β03, β04) 
 Teaching Status 
(Structure) 
Hypothesis 2: Major teaching hospitals’ rate of 
change in quality will be slower than minor and 
non-teaching hospitals’ rate of change in quality. 
Some support          
IQI 20                
(Table 15, β14) 
 Uncertainty 
(Wounded 
Patient) 
Hypothesis 4:  There will be an inverse relationship 
between the percentage of wounded soldiers and 
quality.  
Not supported     
(Table 15, β20) 
  Branch of Service 
(Structure) 
Hypothesis 6: Army hospitals’ rate of change in 
quality will be less rapid than Air Force and Navy 
hospitals’ rate of change in quality.  
Not supported    
(Table 15, β11, β12) 
     PSI Teaching Status 
(Structure) 
Hypothesis 1:  The average level of quality across 
the six years will be higher for major teaching 
hospitals than minor and non-teaching hospitals. 
Not supported         
(Table 16, β03, β04) 
 Teaching Status 
(Structure) 
Hypothesis 2: Major teaching hospitals’ rate of 
change in quality will be slower than minor and 
non-teaching hospitals’ rate of change in quality. 
Not supported    
(Table 16, β13, B14) 
 Uncertainty 
(Wounded 
Patient) 
Hypothesis 4:  There will be an inverse relationship 
between the percentage of wounded soldiers and 
quality.  
Not supported    
(Table 16, B20) 
  Branch of Service 
(Structure) 
Hypothesis 6: Army hospitals’ rate of change in 
quality will be less rapid than Air Force and Navy 
hospitals’ rate of change in quality.  
Some support         
PSI 14                
(Table 16, β11) 
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supported (see Table 22). The rate of productivity change for minor teaching hospitals and non-
teaching hospitals did not differ significantly from major teaching hospitals in the military.    
In addition, branch of armed services, another structural characteristic, was hypothesized 
to influence productivity (Hypothesis 5).  Branch of service was also not found to be a 
significant factor in military hospitals’ changes in productivity over the six years.  Army 
hospitals’ average rate of change in productivity was expected to be slower than Air Force and 
Navy hospitals’ rate of change since the bulk of deployments were made by Army personnel.  
Navy hospitals’ rate of change is negative while the rate of change for Army hospitals is slightly 
positive for productivity  throughout the first five years of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
productivity of Air Force and Navy hospitals declined on average each year which aligns with 
the trend in civilian hospitals to shift traditional inpatient care to the outpatient setting (Tanga et 
al., 2010; Cobourn et al., 2010).    
As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan waged on, staff deployments in support of 
operational medical support would influence military hospitals’ productivity through staff 
turnover and vacancies.  Hospitals with a high percentage of deployed FTEs were hypothesized 
to have lower productivity.  Hypothesis 7 is not supported; there is no meaningful relationship 
between the percentage of deployed FTEs and hospital productivity.  Although statistically 
significant, a corresponding 0.23% decrease in RWPs for each one percentage point increase in 
deployed FTEs is not relevant.  Alexander and colleagues (1994) found that turnover disrupts the 
input/throughput/output cycle and reduces efficiency.  Similar to the findings of O'Brien-Pallas 
and colleagues (2006) and Castle and Engberg (2005), there is evidence of decreased 
productivity as deployment creates an environment of increased turnover.  However, the military 
hospitals are able to compensate for this turnover and possible inefficiency without decreasing 
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productivity in inpatient care.  As organizations use resources to recruit, train, and team build, 
taking away resources away from production of healthcare services, the military hospitals may 
have processes in place to minimize the disruption.  Since military personnel move every two to 
three years between bases routinely, military hospital leaders may already have policies and 
processes in place to accommodate turnover brought on by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Quality 
Inpatient quality indicators. 
Similar to productivity, structural characteristics of hospitals (teaching status and branch 
of service) were hypothesized to influence the level of quality at military hospitals after 
experiencing the jolt in uncertainty due to the conflicts.   Hypothesis 1 was stated as:  the average 
level of quality for all six years is higher for major teaching hospitals when compared to minor 
teaching hospitals and non-teaching hospitals. The mixed effects Poisson regression models for 
inpatient quality indicators results (Table 15) indicate that teaching status was not significantly 
associated with any inpatient quality indicators.  Hypothesis 1 is not supported.  There is no 
relationship between IQIs (pneumonia mortality, laparoscopic cholecystectomy and primary 
cesarean deliveries) and average level of quality when hospitals are stratified by teaching status.  
The evidence for teaching status is mixed.  Studies have shown that major teaching hospitals 
have better quality in AMI but not necessarily in other quality indicators, such as pneumonia 
(Jha, et al., 2005).  One reason may be that AMI mortality is more preventable with the 
appropriate treatment early on in the hospitalization than pneumonia and other conditions.   
With reference to differing rates of change for major teaching hospitals in quality, results 
for only one IQI partially supported Hypothesis 2.  Major teaching hospitals’ rate of change was 
slower (slope closer to zero) than non-teaching hospitals’ rate of change in pneumonia mortality 
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(IQI 20).  For the most part, major teaching hospitals’ rates of change in quality were not 
significantly different from minor and non-teaching hospitals. The expectation that major 
teaching hospitals would be slow to change their structure due to the complexity and rigidness of 
a more bureaucratic organization did not hold true for most of the inpatient quality indicators.  It 
may be that all military hospitals are slow to change due to the inherent bureaucratic nature of 
being a military hospital with many rules and regulations and little flexibility at the local level.  
Another explanation may be that the emphasis on improving quality and better measurement in 
the hospital sector in general, both federal and non-federal hospitals, provided the impetus for 
military hospitals to try to obtain legitimacy by decreasing mortality incidences.  Borzecki and 
colleagues (2010) noticed that VA mortality rates decreased for the following inpatient quality 
indicators, stroke, hip and pneumonia, across the years 2004 to 2007.  The same trend may mask 
the structural differences normally expected utilizing Contingency Theory.   
An inverse relationship was expected between the percentage of wounded soldiers and 
quality (Hypothesis 4).  As the percentage of wounded soldiers increased, quality should 
decrease (more adverse events). Therefore, in order to find support for Hypothesis 4, as the 
percentage of wounded soldiers increased, it is expected that incidences of mortality and adverse 
events would increase.  The percentage of wounded soldiers was not significantly associated 
with any inpatient quality indicators.     
Senior management commitment in providing financial resources for quality 
improvement was identified as one of the factors that differentiated high versus low performing 
hospitals (Curry et al., 2011).  With the increased attention for wounded warrior care, 
expenditures that could be directly related to the global war on terrorism were part of 
supplemental funding from Congress above and beyond the original budget of military hospitals.  
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The teaching hospitals that received the bulk of wounded soldiers would have documented 
expenditures related to the global war on terror.  In the Inspector General report (2008), 
Supplemental Funds Used for Medical Support for the Global War on Terrorism, of the six 
military hospitals audited, the three teaching hospitals received a range of $22.89 to $35.97 
million in additional funds while the three non-teaching hospitals received a range of $2.91 to 
8.52 million in FY 2006.  The additional financial resources may have provided the buffer to 
counter the expected decrease in quality due to the impact of war.     
Although there were overall service differences for laparoscopic cholecystectomy (IQI 
23) and primary cesarean delivery (IQI 33), there were no differences in rates of change in 
events over the six year period of the study among the services.  Hypothesis 6 stated that Army 
hospitals’ rate of change in quality would be less rapid than Air Force and Navy hospitals’ rate 
of change in quality, but that expectation was not borne out in  the study with regard to IQIs. 
Finally, the military hospitals tend to have a younger population of inpatients than civilian and 
VA hospitals since active duty and active duty family members have priority.  Inpatient quality 
indicators that rely on mortality incidence may not be a good metric for quality in military 
hospitals.  Possible other metrics may include 30 day readmission rates and appropriate follow 
up care coordination in the outpatient setting following hospital stays. 
Patient safety indicators. 
The patient safety models produced some significant statistical results (Table 16).  Most 
of the statistically significant results were associated with type of hospital, teaching status and 
overseas status.  In Hypothesis 1, the average level of quality for all six years was hypothesized 
to be higher for major teaching hospitals when compared to minor teaching hospitals and non-
teaching hospitals.  Non-teaching hospitals in the United States had lower incidence of adverse 
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events than major teaching hospitals in complications of anesthesia (PSI 1) and decubitus ulcer 
(PSI 3).  Although teaching status differences were evident in these two PSIs, the direction was 
opposite what was hypothesized.  Minor teaching hospitals had 89% fewer adverse events than 
major teaching hospitals in complications of anesthesia and 58% fewer adverse events in 
decubitus ulcer.  When overseas hospitals are combined with non-teaching hospitals (Table 20, 
PSI 12:  β04 = -0.99, p<0.01) non-teaching hospitals had 63% fewer incidences of postoperative 
pulmonary embolism and DVT than major teaching hospitals.  These results align with the 
studies by Rivard and colleagues (2010) and Vartak and colleagues (2008) in which for some 
PSIs, major teaching hospitals had lower quality than non-teaching hospitals.   
Both studies found that major teaching status was associated with greater likelihood of 
postoperative pulmonary embolism / DVT events, and Rivard and colleagues (2010) postulate 
that this indicator may be sensitive to conditions present on admission.  Incorporating POA 
conditions drastically changes some patient safety indicators (Drosler et al., 2009; Houchens et 
al., 2008).  Houchens and colleagues (2008) found that 54%–58% of previously identified 
postoperative pulmonary embolism/DVT events were no longer considered in-hospital patient 
safety events after accounting for POA conditions. POA indicators were not incorporated into the 
calculation of PSIs for this study, but POAs may have affected the results differently if they had 
been available.  The differences between major teaching hospitals and minor and non-teaching 
hospitals may have decreased if POAs could have been incorporated into the study.   
In addition, the Joint Commission emphasized venous thromboembolism (VTE) 
prevention and prophylaxis during the timeframe of the study.  VTE is a combination of 
pulmonary embolism and DVT, and the emphasis on VTE prophylaxis may have decreased 
incidence in military hospitals in general since all military hospitals, including overseas 
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hospitals, must be accredited by the Joint Commission.  However, due to the increased extremity 
injuries and orthopedic surgical cases from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, major teaching 
hospitals may have had increased opportunities for VTE when compared to non-teaching 
counterparts.  Starting in 2009, measures for VTE prohylaxis is part of the core measure set for 
the Joint Commission’s ORYX program (The Joint Commission, 2013).   
 Thus, this analysis found that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had almost no impact on 
productivity and quality of military hospitals over the years 2001-2006.  None of the war related 
hypotheses (Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 7) were supported.  Productivity and three quality 
indicators (IQI 20 Pneumonia Mortality; PSI 1 Complications of Anesthesia; PSI 3 Decubitus 
Ulcer) differ by the structural characteristic of teaching status in the hypothesized direction, and 
branch of service was only significantly related to productivity and one quality indicator (PSI 14 
Postoperative Wound Dehiscence).  Army, Navy and Air Force hospitals equally were able to 
adapt to the jolt of war and keep quality consistent throughout the years 2001 to 2006.  Even 
though quality in military hospitals differs by teaching status, it is reassuring to see that the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan did not disproportionately burden major teaching hospitals and decrease 
their performance in quality.  The military hospitals may be more agile than at first given credit, 
and they seem to have adapted to deploying staff and receiving increased wounded soldiers 
without increasing the incidence of adverse events as measured by AHRQ inpatient quality and 
patient safety indicators.        
Strengths and Potential Contributions 
This may be the first study of all military hospitals’ performance analyzing certain 
measures of productivity and quality during a time of war.  The study used longitudinal data over 
a six year period. This is also one of the few applications of contingency theory to a multilevel 
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modeling framework in military hospitals.  The military hospitals did not show evidence of the 
initial decrease followed by increasing productivity and quality as anticipated utilizing structural 
contingency theory.   
The ease of calculating AHRQ quality indicators using available administrative data 
makes them a good tool for monitoring inpatient quality and patient safety over time at each 
military hospital level.  All military hospitals have at least one analyst who has access to data in 
the Military Health System Management Analysis and Reporting Tool (M2) to easily calculate 
AHRQ QIs to track at the local level.  M2 is a subset of the MDR with fewer years and an easy 
to use Business Objects interface.  Users of MDR must have SAS programming knowledge.  The 
inclusion of present on admission (POA) data in the MDR in recent years improves the validity 
of the indicators, and POA should be used when tracking hospital performance in quality.  
Although military hospitals do not report to CMS and the Hospital Compare website, they tend 
to mimic the quality efforts of civilian hospitals.  As such, the TRICARE Management Activity 
should initiate a policy for each Service medical activities to start tracking IQIs and PSIs since 
CMS has incorporated select indicators (4 PSIs, 2 IQIs, and 2 composites) into public reporting 
on Hospital Compare. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 There are several limitations to this study.  One limitation is that the current study could 
not incorporate data on conditions that were present on admission to the hospital.  Although the 
AHRQ QI software uses POA data in calculating indicators, the MHS did not begin to collect 
POA information in MDR until December 2010 (TRICARE Management Activity, 2011-b).  
Earlier studies showed that incorporating POA data decreased incidences of adverse PSIs 
(Houchens et al., 2008; Rivard et al., 2010) and IQIs (Pine, 2007).  Although POA were not 
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available for studies during the early part of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, they should be 
incorporated in future uses of quality assessment in military hospitals utilizing AHRQ QIs.   
There were other data limitations in defining and operationalizing the variables for the study.  
For example, the variable Clinician Staffing included both inpatient and outpatient clinician 
FTEs due to limitations in the database for isolating time spent working exclusively in the 
inpatient areas. A similar issue arose in isolating Deployed FTEs since it was not evident 
whether the person deploying was from the inpatient or outpatient work centers.   
 Since AHRQ QIs use administrative data, some have raised concerns whether low 
performance in quality using AHRQ QIs is attributable to coding practices or due to actual 
problems with health care quality (Hussey et al., 2006).  Formal validation studies have been 
conducted in the Veterans Health Affairs in an effort to validate that the AHRQ QI software 
appropriately identifies the adverse events when compared to medical chart reviews (Kaafarani 
et al., 2011; Cevasco et al., 2011).  Among the PSIs validated, three matched the PSIs in this 
study:  Post Operative PE/DVT (PSI 12), Accidental Puncture or Laceration (PSI 15), and 
Postoperative Wound Dehiscence (PSI 14). Of the adverse events identified by the AHRQ QI 
software, 43% of PSI 12 and 85% of PSI 15 were validated as true adverse events by chart 
reviews (Kaafarani et al., 2011).  For PSI 14, 87% of identified events were validated by chart 
reviews (Cevasco, et al. 2011).  However, no validation studies have been completed to date in 
military hospitals.  Future studies should validate quality indicators with a sample of medical 
records to ensure sensitivity and specificity of the AHRQ QI methodology in military hospitals.  
 In utilizing structural contingency theory, due to the long period of time for each 
measurement time period (one year), there most likely are incremental increases and decreases 
that modify fit with the contingencies and the environment which then lead to small structural 
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modifications that were not captured with the multilevel mixed effects model as applied in this 
study.  Smaller time periods of months or quarters may show fluctuation patterns that annual 
time periods mask.  Due to the small occurrences of some of the adverse events in AHRQ PSIs 
and IQIs, the researcher opted to keep the annual time period.  In future studies, using fewer and 
more targeted outcomes such as patient falls, medication errors, and pressure ulcer prevalence 
should be analyzed with smaller time periods to identify these adaptations that structural 
contingency theory proposes.     
 In addition, changes in productivity or quality may be due to other variables not captured 
in this study.  There may be differences in skill and training of personnel, equipment and 
financial resources.  The implementation of TeamSTEPPS that occurred at a few military 
hospitals during the study period was not accounted for in the analysis.  These hospitals may 
have an advantage in communication and coordination, which has been linked to high quality 
care in AMI mortality (Curry et al., 2011).  Future studies could use the ward (medical ward, 
surgical intensive care unit, etc.) as the unit of analysis to form a three-level analysis in order to 
incorporate wards that have implemented TeamSTEPPS to account for one more 
interorganizational variability that may currently be masked at the hospital level.  Adding 
another level to the analysis will enable future researchers to stratify surgical versus medical 
inpatient quality indicators depending on the type of ward.  A smaller organizational unit of 
analysis may also enable comparison of the AHRQ QIs with data from the Military Nursing 
Outcomes Database (MilNOD; Patrician, 2010) utilizing nursing sensitive indicators at the unit 
level such as staff mix and nursing experience as well as unit level outcomes such as falls and 
pressure ulcer prevalence.  In addition, utilizing the survey data collected with implementation of 
TeamSTEPPS (TeamSTEPPS Teamwork Perception Questionnaire and TeamSTEPPS 
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Teamwork Attitudes Questionnaire, AHRQ, 2012) will provide another dimension to the 
research that claims data alone may not be able to capture.   
 Another possibility may be that adaptation occurs not according to the SARFIT model, 
but instead in accordance with Child’s (1972) Strategic Choice Model where fit with the 
contingencies may arise from changing the contingencies versus changing structure.  Future 
studies of quality and productivity in military hospitals should incorporate measures of 
organizational culture and senior management commitment to high quality care following in the 
footsteps of Curry and colleagues (2011).  Information on organizational culture and strategic 
choice may help to explain more of the variation in quality indicators between military hospitals 
than what this study, only using secondary data analysis, was able to identify.   
 The MHS also began to collect electronically all care provided at deployed combat 
support hospitals as the infrastructure in theater improved during the course of the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  It would be interesting to compare quality indicators and measures between 
deployed hospitals and permanent military hospitals.  In addition, all patients transferred to and 
from acute care hospitals were excluded in this study to reduce bias in calculating adverse 
events.  These excluded patients would consist of many of the seriously wounded service 
members transferred to United States hospitals to recuperate from Germany.  With the 
maturation of the information systems in the theater of operations, another study could be 
conducted to follow the quality of care provided to these wounded service members from 
treatment in deployed hospitals in Iraq and Afghanistan all the way through the evacuation 
system to final discharge at a United States based hospital.  Such a study would provide another 
dimension to the impact of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan on military hospital performance.   
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Finally, outpatient care is an important aspect of military hospital performance.  This 
study focused on inpatient services because outpatient quality data were unavailable for the 
whole time period.  The impact of war on outpatient quality and productivity in military facilities 
would be an important addition to the literature.  Since the MHS is an integrated healthcare 
system with direct control over ambulatory care, it would be the ideal system to test episode-
based performance measurement. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this research provides some evidence of differences in productivity and 
quality based on teaching status of military hospitals in a period of conflict.  Military hospitals 
were able to address the jolt of war with variation in their adaptive capacity.  Of the war related 
predictors, only percentage of wounded patients were associated with one dependent variable, 
productivity.  For military hospitals, teaching status was the variable most associated with 
hospital quality of care similar to previous studies (Jha et al., 2005; Rivard, et al., 2010; Vartak et 
al., 2008).  Non-teaching hospitals (especially when overseas hospitals are also included as non-
teaching hospitals) when compared to major teaching hospitals influenced hospital performance.  
Although many of the hypothesized relationships were not realized in the multilevel analysis of 
productivity and quality, the study was a good first step in utilizing national quality measures 
with MHS data.  This study has identified numerous other avenues of research into military 
hospital performance.  As data collection and data warehousing improve, future studies will be 
able to overcome many of the data limitations identified in this study.     
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